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I Abstract 
 
Title: The Uppsala Model’s Applicability on Internationalization Processes of European SMEs, 
Today - A Case Study of Three Small and Medium Sized Enterprises 
Seminar date: 2011-06-01 
Course: BUSM36, Degree Project Master level in Corporate and Financial Management, 
Business Administration Master level, 15 University Credit Points (15 ECTS) 
Authors: Daniel Tykesson and Mikael Alserud 
Tutor: Thomas Kalling 
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Purpose: This paper’s purpose is to increase the understanding of the updated version of the 
Uppsala Model of Internationalization Processes through testing its applicability on European 
SMEs in the today’s environment. 
Methodology: This is a qualitative study with a deductive approach based on three case studies. 
Firstly we develop a theoretical framework based around the Uppsala Model and Entry modes. 
Secondly empirics are collected by performing semi-structured interviews with top managers at 
internationalizing firms. In the following we apply the theoretical framework on the empirical 
findings in order to evaluate the applicability of the selected theory on the studied companies. 
Theoretical perspectives: This study’s theoretical focus is mainly the Uppsala Model of 
internationalization, accompanied by entry modes which are discussed as an indicator of 
commitment. In the theoretical framework we combine the two main theories emphasizing the 
relation between risk, commitment, uncertainty, and the choice of entry mode in the 
internationalization process. 
Empirical foundation: The empirics are based on interviews of individuals with past and 
present experience within the three internationalizing small and medium sized firms. The 
interviews are intended to develop a deeper understanding of what influences a SME’s 
internationalization decisions. 
Conclusions:  
In principal our empirical findings confirm the applicability of the Uppsala Model on SMEs. 
However we believe the Uppsala Model to be very general. This is the reason why it fails to 
explain some complexities in the real world. Simultaneously the model’s general approach is also 
its biggest strength. Since it focuses on explaining the fundamental elements of internationalizing 
firms it is possible to apply the model to a wide range of situations. Nevertheless in order to 
increase its understanding we would appreciate to see a stronger integration of entry modes in 
further developments of the model. Most importantly we want to encourage other researchers to 
test our hypothesis of “limited commitment” on a greater sample. 
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II Preface 
We, the authors of this thesis, decided very early in our master program to write our thesis about 
internationalization theories. Apart from our strong personal interest in this area other reasons to 
do so were that this research field has significantly been influenced by environmental changes 
during the last three decades. The impacts of those changes were discussed heavily and the 
impeachment of existing theories was questioned recently. Some authors are even requiring 
totally new models of internationalization. Our interest was especially in theories explaining how 
companies decide which markets to enter and which entry mode to choose. It is no coincidence 
that we encountered the Uppsala Model since Johanson and Vahlne had very similar research 
questions to ours when they were building the Uppsala Internationalization Process Model 
(Uppsala-Model):  
“Two research questions that seemed to be of strategic relevance attracted the interest of the 
researchers. One concerned the choice of country markets the firms entered. The other was the 
mode of operating in foreign markets.” (Sharma and Blomstermo, 2003 p. 4) 
Since so many different updates and criticism, as well as support exist, our first impression of the 
Uppsala Model was not very clear. Once we got a clear understanding of the whole model and 
after reviewing as well as comparing several internationalization theories we realized its true 
potential. Therefore our target became to increase the understanding of the model and investigate 
its applicability to small and medium sized enterprises in the today’s environment. Since the 
process of internationalization and entry modes are inseparable from our point of view and 
commitment being one of the fundamental factors of the Uppsala Model, we include the entry 
mode theory in this paper in order to use them as an indicator of the latter. The following figure 
illustrates how we approached the topic of this paper and should be used as a road map of this 
paper. 
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  Figure 1: Road map 
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1 Introduction 
In this chapter we will begin with a broader summary of the changes in the business environment 
during the last decades and follow with an extensive review of existing internationalization 
theories. We will continue this chapter by discussing criticism of the Uppsala Model and 
conclude by presenting the purpose, limitations and disposition of this thesis. 
1.1 Background 
The terms globalization and internationalization have been around for quite a while. Taking a 
deeper look into that research field, one realizes quickly that various authors of different time 
periods agree on one thing immediately, the world at the time of their publications has never been 
more global before. The world has become a smaller place more integrated and connected as ever 
before. Bisson, Stephenson and Vigueri, support this view, according to them globalization and 
digital technology have created networks that allow firms to benefit from moving between 
different counties. Additionally trade barriers have been reduced through free trade agreements 
(e.g. NAFTA, Mercosul) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) has achieved tariff 
reductions. Further factors that positively influenced globalization are the establishment of a 
monetary union and the incorporation of new members in the EU. Money, goods, data and people 
have never crossed boarders more frequently. Compared to 1990, trade flows rose 1.5 times faster 
than global GDP and the cross-border capital flows rate grew three times quicker than the GDP 
growth rate. The exchange of information between countries also increased exponentially 
(Bisson, Stephenson & Vigueri, 2010). Advances in communication technology, transportation 
and advances in production processes are the main driving forces behind this (Axinn, & 
Matthyssens, 2002). Of all inventions in the past the discovery of the Internet had indisputably 
the biggest impact on globalization so far. It formed the world to one single network, consisting 
of billion minds. 
According to the neo-classical theory the overall goal of globalization is to improve the standard 
of living of the world’s population. This is supposed to be achieved through free trade of goods, 
services and capital between countries. This again, leads to higher productivity and further 
investments. It seems that this is a goal everyone should share. Paradoxically, significant 
resistance towards globalization exists. This resistance, raised attention through frequently 
violent protests at routine meetings of trade officials (Seattle/N30, Washington A16, Washington 
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G-7 IMF etc.), and publications of respected researchers. J. E. Stiglitz, Nobel Prizewinner in the 
field of economics in 2001, criticizes how globalization is practiced. His main criticism is tended 
towards the International Monetary Fund and the Treasury department of the US government. 
Especially their treatment of developing nations contradicts with Stiglitz views. However he 
believes that the concept of globalization can be used for good and to enrich the poor and the 
wealthy people. According to Stiglitz it all comes down to the application of the theory (Stiglitz, 
2002). Most criticizers would probably agree with the overall goal of globalization, but they do 
not believe in the way governments and companies chose to achieve this goal. However, it seems 
no one can stop the globalization process; even though this process has occasionally been set 
back by its own supporters, such as the US government, when it implemented punitive tariffs 
against foreign steelmakers. This unbalance was quickly corrected by the US government after 
facing pressure from their trade partners. One question remains, is globalization the result of 
companies striving for growth combined with technological developments or is it a goal, 
politicians try to achieve? Nowadays every firm is fighting in a global arena, called “the global 
economy”, exposed to threats and opportunities which appear in the form of competition, as well 
as in access to new markets. Some companies choose to go abroad, because domestic markets are 
stagnant, foreign markets are growing faster and others just follow competitors or just ignore 
their global environment. 
1.2 Internationalization of a Firm 
In the global arena a company needs to find its place, by planning, testing, implementing and 
evaluating internationalization strategies. Different researchers have developed different tools 
and theories to describe internationalization of firms and have made different suggestion of how 
to cope with this changing situation. Below we will give a brief overview over the landscape of 
internationalization theories. We do that, in order to give the reader an understanding in which 
context to put this paper. We start with the neo-classical approach and go on with a concise 
historical overview. Next we continue with a discussion of the most important theories leading to 
the process-based theory and discuss existing process-based theories as well as theories further 
developing the process-based view. On this path we will always mention and explain the most 
important, competing and overlapping theories in a few words. 
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1.2.1 Traditional Models 
The majority of internationalization theories have their origin in industrial organization and 
economics, from Coase over Bain and Williamson. S. A. Hymer was the first who strongly 
criticized the neo-classical theory, which is based among others on the following assumptions: 
people act rationally, have full knowledge of markets, firms focus on profit maximizing and 
markets are balanced. Hymer’s criticism led to one of the three traditional models 
internationalization strategies are based on, the Industrial organization theory (IO) (Hymer, 
1960; Kindleberger, 1969; Caves, 1971; Agmon & Lessard, 1977), the internationalization 
theory (INT) (Coase 1937; Penrose 1959), and the transaction cost theory (TC) (Williamson, 
1971, 1975; 1981). 
The IO theory adds factors of imperfect competition such as transaction cost and limited 
information to the neo-classical model. One basic assumption is that operating overseas is more 
costly than operating in once domestic market. The INT theory rests on Coase’s criticism of the 
neo-classical theory and overlaps partly with the TC theory which was mainly influenced by 
Williamson’s extension of Coase’s ideas. It assumes that multinational enterprises (MNEs) are 
able, to successfully place value adding activities in different parts of the world due to market 
imperfections such as government interference and uncertainty. TC and INT theory conflict with 
the IO theory since it assumes that MNEs can avoid consolidating with market imperfections. 
When external transaction costs exceed internal bureaucratic costs, the firm will expand if the 
opposite is the case the company will downsize (Axinn, & Matthyssens, 2002). The TC- and INT- 
theory were then applied to form MNE and international production theories by McManus 
(1972), Buckley & Casson (1976), Teece (1977), Rugman (1981), Caves (1982) and Hennart 
(1982). 
The eclectic theory (OLI) (Dunning, 1958, 1977, 1979, 1988) exceeds the traditional model by 
considering trade as an additional possibility to invest in order to reach foreign markets. He 
combines the traditional models and adds three factors, the ownership advantage, the location 
advantage and the internationalization advantage. These variables decide whether a MNE shifts 
production to another country or not. Dunning comes to the conclusion that firms can profit from 
production in foreign countries (Axinn, & Matthyssens, 2002). 
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Other models, based on macro-economic features are the Product Life Cycle theory of 
international production, investment and trade (PLC) (Vernon, 1966), Aliber’s theories (Aliber, 
1970, 1993), Pitelis (1991) and Cowling & Sugden’s work (1987). Since the PLC- theory belongs 
also to the process-based theories we will start with discussing Aliber’s theory and get back to the 
PLC in the process-based theory section. 
Aliber in his work from 1966 focuses on financial flows between countries and the trade barriers 
between them. According to him countries with high entry barriers will be a magnet for foreign 
direct investments (FDIs) since companies could overcome trade barriers this way. Moreover he 
believes that firms in countries with a strong currency invest in countries with weak currencies to 
profit from deviations from the Fischer Parity. In his work from 1993 he shifts his focus from the 
financial aspects to the real economy by looking at growth rates of national production.  
Pitelis, Cowling and Sugden deal with the lack of effective demand in monopolistic structures 
and its effect on national growth (Pitelis, 1991 and Cowling & Sugden, 1987). Monopolistic 
advantage theory stresses that multinational firms have superior knowledge due to superior 
manufacturing, brand awareness, patents, talents and a wider product portfolio. As soon as firms 
have established this superior knowledge, they can use it abroad, without any additional costs 
(Hymer, 1976; Caves 1982). According to Oligopolistic reaction theory firms go international, 
following the strategy of other members in the oligopoly, thereby reducing the risk of being 
dissimilar (Knickerbocker, 1973). Knickerbocker and Graham are authors who both focus on 
oligopolistic market structures. Knickerbocker developed the PLC-model further by looking at 
the deviation between the firm’s actual choice of FDIs and the choice suggested by the PLC-
model. He points out risks and uncertainty factors for firms, operating in oligopolistic markets. 
Graham comes from a similar background. He searched for explanations of the transatlantic 
reversal1 (Knickerbocker 1973 and Graham 1978, 1985). 
During the 1970s researcher’s focus shifted temporarily from process-based theories to 
investigating transnational firms (TNFs), investigating the link between transaction cost theory 
and TNFs as well as the relationship between states and TNFs (Jansson, Saqib & Scharma, 1995; 
Scharma 1983; Williamson, 1975; Hennart, 1982; Buckley and Casson 1976). Porter (1985) and 
                                                          
1
 Describes the change of the US being a net outward investor to being a net inward investor.  
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Stopford & Wells (1972) took a close look at TNF applying manager’s view to the strategy and 
structure of TNFs (Blomstermo & Scharma, 2003). 
1.2.2 Process-based Theories 
In the following we focus on the differences between the process-based theories, by comparing 
the Uppsala Model to other existing process-based models. Moreover we finish with presenting 
the network theory since several researches show that market knowledge is established through 
networks of interrelated business relationships (cf. Håkansson 1982; Håkansson & Snehota 1995; 
Blankenburg Holm, Eriksson & Johanson, 1999, Blomstermo & Scharma, 2003). 
The process-based view was first introduced by Vernon (1966) and took a major step forward 
through Johanson &Vahlne’s (1977) work, which continued Wiedersheim-Paul’s (1972) 
publications on uncertainty and economic distance. Other authors, who contributed to a better 
understanding of process-based theories, are: Burenstam-Linder (1961), Aharoni (1966), Bilkey 
and Tesar (1977), Cavusgil (1980) Czinkota (1982), and Reid (1981). To get a closer look at the 
differences between the single internationalization process models take a look at Appendix 1. 
The PLC-theory was the result of research carried out by Harvard University which studied 
internationalization of companies simultaneously with the Uppsala University (Uppsala Model). 
The main idea behind this theory is that developing new products and processes requires 
intensive two-way communication between producers and users. Therefore they need to be 
localized close to each other. This implies that products and processes are developed in counties 
where the demand for these products arises first. Therefore the model assumes, that new products 
were more likely to be developed and produced in advanced countries with a high per capita 
income level and a highly skilled labor force (early-, growth-phase). When the domestic market 
is saturated and mass production as well as economies of scale is reached in the mature phase, the 
company starts exporting competitively to less developed countries. As soon as competition rises 
in the home market and demand becomes more price elastic and rises in the developing countries, 
it is more profitable to move the firm’s production to less developed countries. When these 
countries become big enough for large-scale production, products will be exported to the original 
domestic market (Vernon, 1966, 1979). 
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1.2.3 Taking it One Step Further 
The Uppsala Model of Internationalization by Johanson & Vahlne, (1977, 1990), rests on the 
resource-based view that has its source in the classical theory of the firm (Penrose, 1959). It was 
based on research on the internationalization process of large Swedish manufacturing firms in the 
1970’s. The main accomplishment of their research was that firms tend to enter a new market 
incrementally depending on their market knowledge. It also points out the affect entry mode 
decisions have on time. The model is divided into two basic aspects, state (market commitment, 
market knowledge) and change (Commitment decisions, current activities. Fundamental concepts 
of the Uppsala Model are knowledge, learning, uncertainty, risk and commitment. The Uppsala 
Model is also the only adaptive approach of the process-based models, Bilkey & Teasar’s and 
Cavusgil’s are both reactive models, whereas Czinkota’s model is proactive (Blomstermo & 
Scharma, 2003). 
1.2.4 Differences between the PLC-Theory and the Uppsala Model 
Both Vernon’s and Johanson and Vahlne’s observations researched international developments 
that were the result of firms’ learning processes. However it must be noted, that the PLC-model is 
based on American observations whereas the Uppsala Model is based on observation of Swedish 
firms. The size of the two domestic markets is the main distinction. American firms were able to 
build an international competitive advantage before entering international markets, due to its 
large domestic market; Swedish firm had to enter international markets earlier in order to 
generate the same economies of scale. As mentioned above the model explains the influence of 
income and cost levels in different countries on export and FDIs and does not consider the 
strategy of individual firms. Further it concentrates on knowledge about products and process 
development, while the Uppsala Model focuses on market knowledge as the main factor 
influencing the internationalization of a firm (Blomstermo & Scharma, 2003). 
1.2.5 Differences between the Innovation-based Model and the Uppsala Model 
The Uppsala Model of Internationalization (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977) and the Innovation Model 
(Bilkey & Teaser, 1977; Cavusgil, 1980, 1984 and Czinkota, 1982) are behavioral oriented 
theories. They indicate that firms go abroad in a slow and incremental manner and take the 
environment as an unchangeable factor. Their samples consist both out of manufacturing firms 
and follow Penrose’s resource-based view, focusing on market knowledge, high risk aversion, 
market commitment, uncertainty and their influences on the internationalization processes of a 
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firm. Both models are dynamic, in the sense that the outcome of one decision about foreign 
market entry determines the input for a consequent decision. Experiential knowledge is both 
input and outcome in the internationalization process. It is gained by operating abroad and grows 
a long with time (Madsen & Servais, 1997, (Blomstermo & Scharma, 2003). 
The difference between those models is that the Uppsala-Model interprets the internationalization 
process of a firm as an involving and time consuming organizational learning process, where as 
the Innovation-based model analyses the internationalization process as an innovative decision 
process adapting new ways of doing business (Madsen & Servais, 1997). Johanson and Vahlne 
view experiential knowledge as a factor that reduces uncertainty and creates foreign business 
opportunities. Bilkey and Tesar explain the internationalization process as an even more 
incremental development, classifying companies into various stages and focusing on numerous 
explanatory factors. The Innovation Model differs also between authors, mainly in the number of 
steps (5-6) and the different motives for export. Some authors distinguish between pro active and 
reactive motives, they say it makes a difference if a company is forced to go international by its 
environment or it decides that on its own. 
1.2.6 Network Theory 
The network theory implies that relationships are investments in assets and therefore argues for a 
stronger consideration of a firm’s networks. Firms no longer compete on an individual level; they 
compete on network level, including domestic or foreign suppliers and customer as well as their 
customesrs and their suppliers (Johanson & Mattsson, 1988). The “market-versus-firm” 
distinction central to transaction cost-based theories is challenged by the network theory, looking 
more at the intra relationships in a whole network (Weisterfelder, 2001). 
The network approach has currently been integrated into the latest version of the Uppsala Model 
(Johanson & Vahlne, 2009). It appears that the Uppsala-Model is more general and further 
developed than the other process-based models, due to its frequent updates. 
1.3 Problem Discussion and Critical Review of the Uppsala Model 
As discussed earlier, the majority of the prevailed internationalization theories describe a firm’s 
internationalization as an incremental process of increasing commitment. It stuck out that the 
theories focus on explaining the internationalization of large manufacturing firms. The Uppsala 
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Model, being one of the more recent theories of internationalization, was mainly based on 
empirical findings of the internationalization process of large Swedish Industrial firms (Johanson 
& Vahlne 1977. This raises the question, if the Uppsala Model can be applied to small and 
medium sized enterprises SMEs
2
 as well, according to Blomstermo & Sharma (2003) this is the 
case. Unfortunately they do not name specific reasons for that (Apendix 1). Since the invention of 
the original Uppsala Model the business landscape has changed, the service sector has out grown 
the production sector and new technologies have influenced the day-to-day business extremely. 
These changes are challenging less current models and inventors, who have been trying to adapt 
and update their models such as Johanson and Vahlne.  
1.3.1 The New Environment 
As a result of increased globalization the number of international opportunities and 
internationalization strategies have increased significantly as well as the threat of not expanding 
into foreign countries, missing out on new opportunities. Forsgren (2002) mentions this when 
criticizing the Uppsala Model. He argues that firms might intentionally invest internationally; 
despite of low market knowledge, if the perceived risk of not investing is higher than actually 
investing. One reason for this can be fierce competition and low growth rates in the home market. 
One could argue that this observation does not contradict with the Uppsala Model, since the 
model is not built to explain why a firm chooses to enter a market. Instead it focuses on the 
activities after the decision to go abroad has been made (Johanson & Vahlne 1977, 2009; 
Figueira-de-Lemos, Johanson & Vahlne 2010). 
1.3.2 Psychic and Physical Distance 
The original Uppsala Model suggests that the order of which market a firm enters depends on 
psychic distance and physical distance, beginning with countries closer to its home market 
(Johanson & Vahlne 1977). The world has become more global, which has not decreased 
physical distance, but made it less of an obstacle. As people travel more and companies become 
more global, different cultures encounter more frequent, which makes intercultural management a 
present issue. At the same time digitalization and more convenient travelling makes it easier to 
nurse long distant relations and to participate in global networks. This has also made alternative 
distribution channels possible such as selling and delivering products over the Internet. Hence, as 
                                                          
2
 In accordance with the European Commission (2009) we consider firms as SMEs if they have less than 250 
employees, less than 50 million EUR turnover and a balance sheet total of less than 43 million EUR Appendix 2). 
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the world has changed, old theories might overestimate the implication of both physical and 
psychic distance in the internationalization process both in the case of which market to enter and 
which entry mode to chose. This change has been recognized by Johanson & Vahlne (1990, 
2009) and their focus on psychic distance has been moved towards the risk of not being a 
member of desirable networks. Psychic distance is still regarded as an important factor 
determining the level of uncertainty, but one that can be overcome or reduced by being part of the 
right network. A subject noted by Axinn & Matthyssens (2002) when criticizing the Uppsala 
Model is e-commerce. Internationalizing in this way makes it possible for firms to enter a large 
number of markets, without following the incremental steps suggested by the Uppsala Model. It 
is also argued by the authors that this speeds up the internationalization process and reduces issue 
of psychic and physical distance. However, one could argue that the effects of the phenomena e-
commerce are in accordance with the Uppsala Model’s risk equation based on market 
commitment and market uncertainty.
3
 The level of commitment when using e-commerce is 
arguably low. This makes it possible for the firm to take on a higher level of uncertainty without 
exposing it self to an excessive total level of risk, even though physical distance is of a larger 
extent. Hence, the e-commerce phenomenon is not contradicting the assumptions of the Uppsala 
Model but rather confirms them. Firms will enter markets with less commitment when there is 
high market uncertainty. 
1.3.3 Small and Medium Sized Enterprises 
Nowadays threats and opportunities from globalization are not only relevant to large companies 
but also to SMEs, start-ups as well as established companies. SMEs might seize the opportunity 
to reach a larger market, taking advantage of technological progress. Crick and Jones (2000) 
found in their research that SMEs chose very different ways when going abroad. Furthermore 
they discovered that SMEs often feel an urgent need to internationalize as quickly as possible. 
Studies of SMEs’ internationalization processes have led to some criticism of the Uppsala Model. 
Knight (1997) highlights the phenomenon of “born-globals”. He defines born-globals as firms 
that instantly internationalize. He also points out the difficulty to explain the phenomena using 
present theories of internationalization. Johanson & Vahlne (2009) answered this criticism when 
they added the network view into the original model. In the updated version they use the findings 
of Welch & Welch (1996), Chen & Chen (1998), Ellis (2000), Chetty & Blankenburg Holm 
                                                          
3
 The risk equation: Uncertainty X Commitment = Total Risk. This concept is discussed more in depth in Part 2 
Theory 
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(2000), Elango & Pattnaik (2007) and Loane & Bell (2006), implicating the importance of 
existing networks in a firm’s internationalization process (Johanson & Vahlne 2009). Taking the 
impact of networks and relationships between firms into account, they recognize a wider range of 
knowledge acquisition. This partly explains the more rapid pace of internationalization. They also 
point out that their model does not claim, internationalization necessarily being a slow process. 
However, there needs to be a sufficient amount of time to accumulate enough knowledge in order 
to decrease uncertainty. 
1.3.4 Services versus Products 
Business organization and character differs substantially between service and manufacturing 
firms. In most cases it is not possible to create a service in one country and to consume it in 
another, since services are considered to be created and consumed at the same time and place, in 
cooperation with the customer (Grönroos, 2002). However there are some exceptions such as call 
centers, where the service is provided over the phone or Internet which allows different locations 
between service provider and customers. A firm active in the service sector will take different 
internationalization steps than a manufacturing firm. There will be differences in the kind, the 
amount and the reversibility of invested resources. For instance a firm in the service sector will 
not be forced to invest in factories and does not need to take transportation of finished goods in to 
account. Though, it might be more important for a service provider to overcome cultural barriers 
such as foreign language and customs when establishing its business abroad. 
1.3.5 Determinism 
Another point of criticism regards the higher speed of internationalization leaving the Uppsala 
Model as too static (Andersen 1997) and deterministic (Petersen et al. 2003). Johanson and 
Vahlne (1990, 2009) argue that their model is not static but instead dynamic. Further, they argue, 
“[…] our model focuses on the processes driving continuous change of those [the firm] 
boundaries.” (Johanson & Vahlne, 2009 p. 1426). Regarding the accusation, of the model being 
deterministic Johanson and Vahlne agree on the causal relationship between experiential learning 
and commitment of resource. Their definition of causal, though, does not suggest that one factor 
is determining the other, but rather that there is a relationship where the factors influencing each 
other. They also admit that there usually are several factors, other than experiential learning and 
commitment that also have an impact on the causal relationship (Johanson & Vahlne 2009). 
According to Andersen (1997) and Petersen et al. (2003) the accusation of being too deterministic 
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also implicates that the Uppsala Model neglects managerial action. Axinn and Matthyssen (2002) 
continue by stating that today’s firms have flatter hierarchies and that inter-firm relations and 
structures are more flexible. In the light of these arguments they claim that: “[…] managers play 
an increasingly important role in the development of firms' internationalization strategies.” 
(Axinn and Matthyssens, 2002 p. 445). This is especially true for SMEs which are likely to share 
these characteristics due to their smaller size. Johanson and Vahlne (2009) agree in that 
management’s opinions and perceptions are important, although they state that they believe 
managers will be biased by path dependency making them favor certain alternatives to other 
ones. They end by simply adding “[w]e also think that the model can easily incorporate 
managerial discretion and strategic intentions.” (Johanson & Vahlne 2009, p 1417). The authors 
of this paper would have preferred a deeper discussion by Johanson and Vahlne of how it could 
be integrated into the model. 
1.3.6 Concept of Learning 
One of the major reviews of the Uppsala Model was made by Forsgren (2002) and one of his 
larger criticisms about the model concerns the concept of learning. In the Uppsala Model learning 
is considered to take place incrementally as experience increases. Forsgren (2002) however 
points out that there has been a large amount of research showing that there are more dimensions 
of organizational learning. It is argued that firms can learn from other firms in their network by 
having access to their knowledge and thereby not having to experience them self (cf. Forsgren, 
2002; Hansen, 1999; Kraatz, 1998; Kumar & Kofi, 1998; Lane & Lubatkin, 1998; Levitt & 
March, 1988). Imitative learning is another alternative to experiential learning where the firm 
tries to do as other successful firms do and thereby gaining experience (cf. Forsgren 2002; 
Björkman, 1990, 1996; Di Maggio & Powell, 1983; Haveman, 1993; Haunschild & Miner, 1997; 
Huber, 1991; Lewitt & March, 1988). To hire people with experience, acquiring local firms or 
simply perform a focused research for information are also argued to be alternative ways of 
increasing knowledge without experiential learning (Forsgren, 2002). Johanson and Vahlne 
respond to this criticism in 2009. One of their arguments is that for a firm to be able to recognize 
which firm to acquire, people to hire and firm to imitate, it has to gain some experience of its own 
even if they admit that recent research forces them to adapt their conclusions on a firm’s learning 
process. They also acknowledge the argument about the possibility of acquiring knowledge from 
the firm’s network in the same article as they integrate the network view. However, Johanson and 
12 
 
Vahlne (2009) point out that theoretical models are usually not considered as an exact reflection 
of reality, but as an explanation of the most fundamental components of reality. Since the 
Uppsala Model is more general it will not in a detailed way explain different kinds of 
occasionally relevant situations. Referring to studies on organizations’ learning processes, (cf. 
Argote, 1999; Nelson & Winter, 1982; Cohen & Levinthal 1990) they argue that experiential and 
accumulative learning is fundamental even if it most certainly can and will be complemented by 
various kinds of additional learning processes (Johanson & Vahlne 2009). 
1.3.7 Stages of Internationalization 
A substantial part of the criticism that has been directed towards the original Uppsala Model 
focuses on the stages of internationalization (Hedlund & Kverneland, 1985; Oviatt & McDougall, 
1994; Zahra, Ireland, & Hitt, 2000; et al). Johanson and Vahlne respond in 2009 pointing out 
”[…] that the establishment chain is not part of the model, but rather a summary of the empirical 
observations on which we based our inductive theoretical arguments.” (p. 1420). The exact way 
of entering new markets is not the focus of the model, even if it suggests that the commitment to 
the market will increase incrementally. Moreover, it is the relationship between knowledge 
accumulation, management of commitments that is central. The changes observed in firms’ 
behavior is considered rather to be a result of changes in the business environment than changes 
of the mechanism of internationalization (Johanson & Vahlne 2009). 
1.3.8 Research Discussion 
Researchers have tried to adopt their models in order to update them in accordance with 
environmental changes. Those researchers have been criticized for integrating theories which 
premises are not perfectly compatible (Axinn & Matthyssens 2002). Even if the Uppsala Model 
was originally based on empirics of large Swedish multinationals, recent research has 
successfully used the Uppsala Model to explain internationalization processes of SMEs. Since 
then Johanson and Vahlne have made substantial changes of their original model by integrating 
the network view in order to increase its applicability (cf.. Su & Poisson 2000; Chetty & 
Blankenburg Holm 2000). The last update was made in 2009, as a response to criticism as well as 
new empirical and theoretical findings. 
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1.4 Purpose 
This paper’s purpose is to increase the understanding of the updated version of the Uppsala Model of 
Internationalization Processes through testing its applicability on European SMEs in the today’s 
environment. 
To achieve this we formulated the following research questions, which are based on the criticism 
mentioned in the problem discussion above: 
Research question 1: How does psychic and physical distance influence internationalization 
strategies of SMEs in today’s environment? 
Research question 2: How does top management’s background and network affect the choice of 
internationalization strategies and markets? 
Research question 3: How do commitment and, uncertainty influence the choice of entry mode of 
SMEs? 
Research question 4: What steps do SMEs take in the internationalization process and is there a 
difference of start-ups and established companies? 
Research question 5: Does the internationalization process of a firm differ, depending on the 
product’s nature? 
1.5 Limitations 
This paper’s conclusiveness is limited, to three specific cases. Therefore it is not meant to be 
representative from a statistical point of view. Due to the limited range of studied companies and 
their characteristics, German or Swedish origin and their size (SMEs) as well as their European 
sales structure, the results of the interviews need to be interpreted in this very specific context. 
Yet, the results can possibly be applied to other similar cases of internationalization processes. 
Motives considering the choice of the different cases are laid out in the method part of this thesis. 
Moreover this paper focuses heavily a process-based internationalization theories, namely the 
Uppsala Model of Internationalization Processes. Additionally we include entry modes to 
increase the understanding of the Uppsala Model. We discuss other internationalization strategies 
in the introduction of this paper very briefly. A further discussion would exceed the scope of this 
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paper. However the discussion shows the reader the landscape of the existing internationalization 
theories and hopefully makes appetite for further readings. 
1.6 Disposition  
This paper will follow its purpose by illuminating 
the different versions of the Uppsala-Model, 
increasing its understanding and discussing its 
criticism. Then the paper continues by explaining 
different entry modes, linking them to the Uppsala 
Model; ranking entry modes in terms of their 
market commitment. Based on that a theoretical 
framework will be built, which is together with the 
research question the foundation of the empirical 
study and will lead to an empirical answer to our 
purpose. However, before we show our empirical findings we explain our research methodology. 
The next step is the analysis, which relates the empirical results to the theory. We analyze our 
empirical findings and evaluate the applicability of the Uppsala Model to European SMEs in the 
today’s business environment. Finally we will sum up our developments, made in the progress of 
writing this paper, in a conclusion (Figure 2). 
  
Source: Alserud & Tykesson, 2011 
Figure 2: Disposition 
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2 Theory 
In this chapter we guide the reader through the Uppsala Model, starting by presenting the 
original Uppsala Model from 1977. We then continue by adding the changes made by the authors 
over time. Subsequently we increase the understanding of the Uppsala Model by illuminating 
certain parts of the model which we think are not explained thoroughly enough by Johanson and 
Vahlne. Since the process of internationalization and entry modes are undividable from our point 
of view, we proceed by explaining entry mode theory to use it later as an indicator of a firm’s 
commitment to a market. This results into the theoretical framework of this paper which 
surrounds our empirical research and analysis. 
2.1 The Uppsala Model 
The Uppsala Model of internationalization processes was first published in an international 
academic review in 1977 (Johanson & Vahlne). It has since then been revised a number of times 
(Johanson & Vahlne 1992, 2002, 2006; Figueira-de-Lemos, Johanson & Vahlne 2010). The 
authors Johanson and Vahlne founded their model on empiric findings of Hörnell, Vahlne & 
Wiedersheim-Paul, (1972); Johanson & Wiedersheim-Paul, (1975); Johanson, (1966); Forsgren 
& Kinch, (1970). It is based on the process and order that several Swedish firms seemed to 
follow during their internationalization processes in the late sixties and seventies. The findings 
suggested that firms in their internationalization processes incrementally increases their 
commitment on a foreign market by increasing their presence as time passes and knowledge of 
the market grows. Firms began expanding to markets that were most similar to their domestic 
market (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977). These findings were contradicting with the present truth 
about internationalization at that time (Johanson & Vahlne 1977, 2009). In the first article of the 
Uppsala Model, it was argued that companies entered new markets with a low level of 
commitment, e.g. exporting via agent, establishing a sales subsidiary and launching a production 
facility. As their knowledge of the market increased, more resources would be invested. The 
increased presence would then lead to an increase in knowledge and further commitment 
(Johanson & Vahlne 1977, 2009). Although Johanson and Vahlne focus on specific entry modes 
in the original paper from 1977, in more recent papers they point out that the model is not about 
entry modes, but instead about the processes of internationalization (Johanson & Vahlne 1992). 
The model aims to explain management’s decisions, on opportunity and risk taking, based on the 
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firm’s level of commitment to a foreign market. Furthermore it explains how the experience and 
learning processes within the firm affect management’s decisions. 
2.1.1 The Internationalization Process Model 
The Uppsala Model of internationalization processes consists of four stages, which explain how 
the learning- and opportunity perception affect, and is affected by the current environment of the 
firm. The model is considered to be dynamic by its authors; the result from one process is the 
input for the next step of the process, which will provide input for the next one, and so forth. The 
circular relationship between the concepts states that the process does not have a beginning or an 
end. The model distinguishes between the state and change variables each is divided into two 
aspects. In the original model the focus was laid on a specific firm and its activities in the foreign 
market and that market’s level of uncertainty (Johanson & Vahlne 1977). In the new model from 
2009, relationships and networks are taken into account more extensively (Figure 3). 
 
 
2.1.1.1 State-side 
The state variable considers aspects that are temporarily fixed by its nature, as for example a 
current situation or position. Since the internationalization process takes place within the firm’s 
network, the current network position is an important aspect. Previously this aspect only 
considered market commitment. In the updated version it is argued, that market commitment is 
too narrow, therefore the model includes the firm’s current relations. The relations are 
characterized by the level of knowledge, trust and commitment (Johanson & Vahlne 2009). It is 
within this position the firm can develop knowledge and seize opportunities on the market. 
 
Figure 3: The internationalization process model 
Source: Johanson & Vahlne, 1977 
  
Source: Johanson & Vahlne,  2009
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The second aspect on the state side of the model is knowledge and opportunities. Knowledge 
regards the current amount of knowledge, about the foreign market, within the firm. To make it 
even clearer that this knowledge is critical in order to recognize opportunities, the concept of 
opportunities was added. In contrast to the resource-based view and in accordance with the 
network view, the Uppsala Model from 2009 argues that the firm can recognize opportunities 
outside of its boundaries, i.e. in the context of its network. Hence, knowledge about internal 
capabilities is as important as knowledge about resources within the whole network (Johanson & 
Vahlne, 2009). 
2.1.1.2 Change-side 
In the original model, the change aspects included commitment decisions and current decisions 
(Johanson & Vahlne 1977). The word relationship has been added to commitment decision in 
order to clarify that it regards the firms’ decisions of further commitment to relationships within a 
specific country (Johanson & Vahlne 2009). 
In the updated version the term current activities has been replaced by learning, creating and 
trust-building. Current activities are still central but more focus has been put on the outcome of 
current activities. Experiential learning is part of both versions of the model; in the later version 
more forms of learning processes are added. However it remains the most important type of 
learning. Trust-building is important, since the network view has been added. Commitment to a 
network or to relations has to include a mutual trust in order to be rewarding (Johanson & Vahlne 
2009). 
All aspects in the internationalization process model are interlinked. A firm’s current network 
position is the fundament on which the firm gathers its knowledge. The total amount of 
knowledge is determining the firm’s ability to perceive opportunities upon which relationship 
commitment decisions are taken. The decisions again lead to the firm’s learning, creating and 
trust-building which, will form a new position within the network of the firm as time passes. This 
cycle of actions and events is how the internationalization process is understood by the authors of 
the Uppsala Model, starting with low commitment and high uncertainty, incrementally increasing 
commitment as knowledge increases (Johanson & Vahlne 1977, 2009). 
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2.1.2 The Network Theory within the Uppsala Model 
The network perspective was added to the original Uppsala Model, due to increasing globalism 
and new information and communication technologies (Johanson & Vahlne 1990, 2009). 
Research has shown that the choice of country and entry mode is affected by the firm’s network 
and its position within it (Coviello & Munro 1995, 1997; Martin, Swamminathan & Mitchel 
1998; Ellis 2000). In the updated version of the Uppsala Model the business environment is 
considered as an international network of relations, due to the fact that boundaries between firms 
and markets became vaguer over the last decades (Johanson & Vahlne 2009). The following core 
arguments by Johanson and Vahlne are based on the network theory. Companies take part in 
different networks and are linked in ways that differ in complexity and closeness to other firms. 
To be successful in foreign markets it is necessary to be part of a strong network. A firm’s 
relations are created out of the social engagements with other firms, in which the involved firms 
sequentially and interactively develop their relation. As the relation evolves, firms accumulate 
knowledge and build trust. By participating in networks firms will expand their knowledge of 
markets and hence reduce uncertainty (Johanson & Vahlne 2009). 
2.1.3 Key Concepts 
In the original Uppsala Model, uncertainty and commitment are the two factors determining the 
level of risk associated with entering new markets, both of which are still fundamental to the 
updated model. Uncertainty represents a firm’s lack of knowledge about a market. Commitment 
embodies the resources that a firm invests in a foreign market. The firm is risking losing these 
resources by operating and investing in this market. Hence, to affect the level of risk a firm faces 
on a certain market, it needs to change its level of commitment or market knowledge (Johanson 
& Vahlne 1977; Figueira-de-Lemos, Johanson & Vahlne 2010). The relationship of these factors 
is illustrated by Johanson & Vahlne (1977) as: 
 R = U x C 
 R = Total risk associated with the market 
 U = Uncertainty  
 C = Commitment 
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The level of risk might change independent of a firm’s efforts, for example when additional 
competitors enter the market, a new technology is introduced or political turbulences appear 
(Figueira-de-Lemos, Johanson & Vahlne 2010). 
2.1.3.1 Uncertainty 
Risk and uncertainty are often used as synonyms; yet, Johanson and Vahlne keep them separated 
but dependent. In their framework they divide the concept of uncertainty into two parts, 
contingent uncertainty and pure uncertainty. It is impossible to reduce or eliminate pure 
uncertainty since it is based on the uncertainty that automatically follows the existence of a 
future. The firm on the other hand can influence contingent uncertainty. The more managers 
know, learn and understand, the better they get at managing contingent uncertainty. For example 
the more alternatives management perceive, the less ignorant managers become. Hence, 
contingent uncertainty depends on the knowledge base while pure uncertainty does not. Since 
contingent uncertainty can be influenced, the authors of the Uppsala Model focus on this type of 
uncertainty (Figueira-de-Lemos, Johanson & Vahlne 2010). When discussing “uncertainty” in 
this paper, it is defined as “contingent uncertainty” if nothing else is referred to. 
In the early version of the Uppsala Model uncertainty is dependent on physical and psychic 
distance between the home market and the foreign market (Johanson & Vahlne 1977). Physical 
distance is the geographic distance between the two markets. They define psychic distance as 
“[…] as the sum of factors preventing the flow of information from and to the [foreign] market.” 
(Johanson & Vahlne 1977, p 24) Such factors can be, for example: language, education, culture 
and industrial development. As the network perspective was introduced into the Uppsala Model, 
less focus has been put on psychic distance and instead the main factor creating uncertainty is 
considered to be “outsider ship”, i.e. not being part of a knowledge accumulation network. 
2.1.3.2 Knowledge 
Increasing the firm’s knowledge about the market can reduce uncertainty. The most critical factor 
constraining internationalization is considered to be lack of knowledge (Johanson & Vahlne 
1977, 2009). This statement is in accordance with results from an observation undertaken by the 
European Union (EIM Business & Policy Research, 2010), which shows that firms find the lack 
of knowledge to be the greatest obstacle when expanding into foreign markets. According to 
Penrose (1966), knowledge is divided into two classifications, the first being objective knowledge 
and the second experiential knowledge. Objective knowledge can be acquired through books and 
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lectures and it is possible to be passed from one individual to another. Experiential knowledge on 
the other hand can only be acquired through the individual’s own experience. Experiential 
knowledge is also the most critical form of knowledge according to the Uppsala Model, because 
it is much harder to gain and incorporate within a firm. It is also considered the type of 
knowledge that makes it possible to perceive and react to market opportunities (Johanson & 
Vahlne 1977). 
Johanson & Vahlne (1977) also make a distinction between general knowledge and market 
specific knowledge, where the former is more associated with objective knowledge and the latter 
with experiential knowledge. General knowledge is more connected with, for example, how the 
firm is interacting with other firms, theories on marketing business-to-business or to end 
customers and how to market a premium product versus a mass-produced product. This type of 
knowledge is easier to transfer between different markets. Market specific knowledge is more 
closely connected to the characteristics of a specific market such as business climate, culture and 
the structure of a market, but also to the characteristics of individual actors and stakeholders 
within the market (Johanson & Vahlne 1977). Even though there is a distinction between general 
and market specific knowledge, they are both important and “[…] knowledge accumulation 
should not be seen as a sequential process, but rather as the amalgamation or interplay among 
objective and experiential knowledge.” (Figueira-de-Lemos, Johanson & Vahlne 2010, p 146). 
Moreover, knowledge within the updated version of the Uppsala Model is not only considered to 
be the existing knowledge within an individual firm. Instead it is the sum of the individual 
knowledge of a firm and the knowledge within a firm’s network. To make the exchange of 
knowledge possible trust needs to exist between the counterparts in a relation. Since knowledge 
is a determining factor of uncertainty, being part of a network is critical to reduce the company’s 
risk level (Johanson & Vahlne 2009). 
Increasing experience can be a time consuming process. Therefore the payoff, of an increase in 
market knowledge through further market commitment will not be achieved straight away. 
Besides acquiring knowledge through increased experience, there are basically two ways of 
improving a firm’s knowledge: hiring workers with market specific knowledge and perceiving 
counseling from market experts with experience and knowledge about the market. However 
acquiring a local company or buying services from a consultant agency does not eliminate the 
lime-lag described above. Therefore Johanson & Vahlne (1977) introduce the concept of firm 
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specific knowledge. According to them, just as there is tacit knowledge about a market, there is 
tacit knowledge about a firm that needs to be experienced in order to apply it. This implies, that 
in order to transfer market specific knowledge, individuals in possession of the market specific 
knowledge also need to posses firm specific knowledge in order to transfer it. Without firm 
specific knowledge, market specific knowledge will not lead to satisfying opportunity 
recognition.  
To sum up, knowledge and uncertainty are evidently and closely linked. As market knowledge 
increases, uncertainty decreases. This implicates that the total level of risk will also decrease, 
allowing an increase in the second risk determining factor commitment without exceeding the 
tolerable risk limit.  
2.1.3.3 Commitment 
A firm’s commitment to a market has two dimensions. Firstly commitment is measured in terms 
of resources invested into the market. Secondly, the irreversibility of those resources must be 
taken into consideration. For example investments that are simply reversed, with a close to full 
value return, present a lower commitment than investments in very specific assets with no 
secondary market (Figueira-de-Lemos, Johanson & Vahlne 2010). Vertical integration is almost 
always considered as a larger commitment than horizontal. The original model from 1977 focuses 
on one-way commitments and on more physical commitments, such as investments in factories 
(Johanson & Vahlne 1977). When the network view was integrated (Johanson & Vahlne 2009), a 
“softer” definition of commitment was used. Johanson & Vahlne (1990 & 2002) go as far as 
arguing that a successful internationalization process demands a reciprocal commitment between 
a firm and its partners. Commitments can be made either in tangible or intangible assets. 
Tangible assets are easier to evaluate in terms of costs and revenue and includes for example 
trucks, equipment and plants. Intangible assets in contrast are harder to measure, and concern 
attempts to increase the knowledge and control of market conditions. To create a working relation 
both time and monetary resources are required, making it a large commitment since the 
investment is not easily reversed (Figueira-de-Lemos, Johanson & Vahlne 2010). 
2.1.4 Risk Management 
In 2010 Figueira-de-Lemos, Johanson & Vahlne presented a paper focusing on the risk 
management implications found in the Uppsala Model. They proceed from the definition of risk, 
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R = U x C, from 1977 by further explaining how the model can be used to understand manager’s 
risk behavior in the internationalization process. Basically they argue that management can adjust 
the firm’s commitment to the market, thereby handling the risk exposure of the firm. 
2.1.4.1 Uncertainty and Commitment a Trade-off 
The total risk a firm will be exposed to is the 
product of uncertainty and commitment (R=U x 
C). There is a trade-off between those two factors. 
An increase in commitment leads to a higher total 
risk but will also result in a lower degree of 
uncertainty and therefore to an unchanged level of 
risk in the end, see Figure 4. As the firm enters a 
new market their knowledge will be low and 
hence the uncertainty high. Therefore the 
company will commit resources to a certain level 
that together with the given level of uncertainty, 
will result in an total risk level (TR), that should 
be equal or less than the predetermined maximum 
tolerable risk level (MTR) the company is willing to take (Figueira-de-Lemos, Johanson & 
Vahlne, 2010). 
However, this process is not as simple as indicated in Figure 4 due to the existence of a time-lag. 
According to Figure 4 an increase in commitment leads immediately to a decrease of uncertainty. 
This is a strongly simplifying assumption since it takes time for increased commitment to 
generate knowledge, see Figure 5. Furthermore it is unrealistic to believe that knowledge 
acquired through an acquisition can be used entirely, and straight away. Even though the acquired 
firm possesses market knowledge, the lack of firm specific knowledge does not allow full access 
to market knowledge. Johanson & Vahlne (1977) briefly touch this topic in the original Uppsala 
Model and further elaborate on that issue in their most current update of the Uppsala Model 
(Figueira-de-Lemos, Johanson & Vahlne, 2010). To increase the understanding of Johanson and 
Vahlne’s rather short discussion about the issue we continue by improving the presentation of the 
time-lag in the Uppsala Model below. The orange line in Figure 5 represents the total risk of a 
firm at different points in time. According to Figure 4 this line would be a parallel to the x-axis. 
Figure 4: Total risk curve 
Alserud & Tykesson 2011 based on Figueira-de-Lemos, 
Johanson & Vahlne, 2010 
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Figure 5: Time-lag 
The left graph in Figure 5 shows how an increase of commitment immediately raises the firm’s 
risk level since there are more resources at risk. The risk level decreases only slowly back to the 
original level, as the firm acquires more knowledge. This process repeats itself, when the 
commitment to a foreign market is increased again. The right graph in Figure 5 shows a more 
realistic description of the fluctuating total risk level (TR). The maximum tolerable risk level 
(MTR) can be exceeded through too high commitment on a certain market. Additionally the total 
risk can instantly be reduced, to a desired level of risk. This is the case, when a company decides 
to decrease its commitment, e.g. by divesting from a foreign market. We call this the time-lag of 
the Uppsala Model. 
The time-lag will occur since the learning process is not instant but requires time (Figueira-de-
Lemos, Johanson & Vahlne 2010). As previously discussed there are several ways of gaining 
knowledge. They differ in the time it takes a company to absorb and use the knowledge in order 
to decrease uncertainty and total risk. E.g. the use of agents, in a foreign market, leads to a low 
experiential knowledge but allows fast access to the agent’s knowledge. M&As provide much 
more experiential knowledge but it takes significantly longer to achieve this knowledge due to 
the existence of firm specific knowledge. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1.4.2 Ways of Managing Risk 
A firm’s presence on a certain market, as well as belonging to a strong network, will lead to new 
experiences and the accumulation of greater knowledge, consequently reducing uncertainty 
(Johanson & Vahlne 2009). This leaves management two options to decrease the risk level: 
 
Alserud & Tykesson 2011 
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1. Reducing the level of commitment 
2. Increase the level of knowledge, either through increased commitment or by waiting for 
present commitment to pay off in increased knowledge. 
Commitment is an internal variable and can therefore be controlled by the firm. Uncertainty on 
the other hand is dependent on external changes or the firm’s knowledge about the market. 
(Johanson & Vahlne, 1977; 2009) The first option named above, a decrease of commitment, will 
lead to a more or less immediate reduction of total risk since invested resources (commitment) in 
the market are reduced and no longer at risk. The second option, an increase in commitment, is 
expected to lead to a reduction of uncertainty, ideally resulting in a lower level of total risk as 
shown in Figure 6. Starting at point 1, the firm faces less total risk than its maximum tolerable 
risk level allows, since TR1 is left of MTR (Graph1, Figure 6). If acting in accordance with the 
second option of risk management, the firm will increase its commitment on the foreign market 
(Graph 2, Figure 6). The fourth graph in Figure 6 illustrates that the increased commitment will 
immediately lead to a higher level of total risk. Therefore, the firm’s risk level will change from 
point 1 to point 2, as illustrated in the second graph in Figure 6. The total risk-curve will then 
change from TR1 to TR2, where TR2 equals the maximum tolerable risk level, MTR. As time 
passes, uncertainty will slowly decrease due to increasing knowledge about the market (Graph 4, 
Figure 6). The third graph in Figure 6 shows how the risk level changes from point 2, to point 3, 
resulting in an inward shift of the total risk-curve, from TR2 to TR3. Since TR3 is located to the 
left of TR1 the firm has reduced its risk level through the use of the second option. To sum up, 
the firm first increases its commitment, which automatically leads to an increase of the total risk 
level. As time passes and knowledge is acquired, the firm ends up with a lower risk level than 
initially. 
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2.1.5 Figueira-de-Lemos Johanson and Vahlne’s Hypotheses of Risk 
Management 
Figueira-de-Lemos, Johanson & Vahlne (2010) present different hypotheses, which explain how 
management balances the relationship between uncertainty and commitment in the 
internationalization process. Johanson and Vahlne (2010) argue that firms will behave differently 
depending on how heavily they have committed to a certain market. 
A firm entering a new market with low knowledge, high uncertainty and low commitment might 
have gathered objective knowledge but lacks experiential knowledge. Therefore it tries to find as 
many relationships and business opportunities as possible. Commitments tend to be more about 
intangible assets, i.e. relations, than tangible assets (Figueira-de-Lemos, Johanson & Vahlne 
2010). If risk is reduced firms in this position will commit more resources to intangible assets. In 
Figure 6: Increasing commitment leading to a lower level of total risk 
Alserud & Tykesson 2011 based on Figueira-de-Lemos, Johanson & Vahlne, 2010 
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the opposite case, the firm will likely exit the market, possibly due to a low commitment in 
tangible assets. 
Further Figueira-de-Lemos, Johanson & Vahlne (2010) argue that a firm that is more committed 
to the market will react differently to changes in the level of risk. If risk is reduced the firm will 
commit more resources to tangible assets. If risk is increased the firm’s response depends on its 
knowledge base and its existing network. However the firm tends to delay tangible commitments 
and increase intangible commitments when risk is high. 
Finally, firms with great knowledge about a specific market and substantial commitment know 
how to react when uncertainty levels fluctuate. The firm might engage in takeovers and efforts to 
extend its network even further, deepening its understanding and readiness to change. If risk is 
reduced the firm will increase its commitment in both tangible and intangible assets. In the 
opposite case the firm will reduce tangible commitments (Figueira-de-Lemos, Johanson & 
Vahlne, 2010). 
The hypotheses are based on the original Uppsala Model and the updated version from 2009. 
They were created to anticipate and explain the effects contingent risk has on a firm’s 
commitment in different stages of internationalization. Key elements are uncertainty and 
commitment and their relation to risk. Additionally the model of processes plays an important 
role where an increased commitment at one point in time leads to increased knowledge, which in 
turn leads to experienced based decisions about new commitments. This process repeats itself 
over and over again. The authors of the hypotheses admit not having tested them thoroughly but 
encourage future researchers to take on such a task (Figueira-de-Lemos, Johanson & Vahlne 
2010). 
2.2 Entry modes 
In the following we will name, summarize and discuss advantages as well as drawbacks of 
different entry modes. We are aware of the fact that the choice of entry mode depends on many 
variables such as: past experience, psychic distance, political/trade barriers, regulations, 
competition, size and growth of the target markets, control, distribution, committed resources, 
resources transferred and motivation as well as time limitations. Some of these variables can be 
influenced by the firm some of them are given by the environment of the firm. Root (1998) 
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divides those factors into external (target country market factors, target country environmental 
factors, target country production factors, home country factors) and internal factors (company 
product factors, company resource/ commitment factors). 
2.2.1 Exporting 
Exporting is recognized as the least risky internationalization strategy. It is a good strategy to test 
demand in a foreign market especially when available funding is limited. The Internet, often a 
missing market entry mode in older models increased its importance significantly over time. This 
was a fortunate and unexpected surprise for many companies, since Internet-marketing started out 
as a distribution channel for the domestic market. Necessary support for using the Internet as a 
distribution channel came from credit card and delivery companies (Cateora, Gilly & Graham, 
2009). However it must be stated, that certain products can be sold easier over the Internet than 
others and therefore it is not a panacea to go abroad. 
Indirect exporting: A company’s products are offered in foreign markets, but the firm itself does 
not engage in international trade. Sale efforts are carried by distributors or importers located in 
the same country as the exporting enterprise. 
Direct exporting: The firm itself undertakes the effort and invests resources for exporting. 
Products or services are sold: via agents or distributors located in foreign market, company 
export salesman or through a sales subsidiary (John, 1997). This strategy is most frequently used 
by companies taking their first international step. The aim is to minimize risks of financial losses 
(Cateora, Gilly & Graham, 2009). However it should be kept in mind that exchange rates and 
implementation of tariffs are risks which come along with this strategy. The efforts are now 
borne to a much larger extent by the exporting company itself. The company has to construct 
contracts, undertake market research, handle export documentation and transportation set prices 
and provide a marketing and distribution structure. The choice for direct exporting shows a 
stronger commitment to foreign markets than indirect exporting and facilitates greater control and 
information feedback (Young, Hamill, Wheeler & Davies, 1989). 
Direct sales is one form of direct exporting that takes the commitment to foreign markets even 
further, by establishing an own sale force with local and/or expatriate managers (Cateora, Gilly & 
Graham, 2009). It is the logical, next step for a firm who had been able to increase market 
knowledge to cut out agents or distributors and increase its profit margin. Country-specific 
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knowledge hold by agents or distributors is lost, but can be regained through employing local 
staff. Moreover direct export through a partly or wholly owned sales subsidiary increases the 
company’s commitment and risk in the foreign market. On the other hand it overcomes problems 
arising from the cooperation with agents or distributors. E.g. the agent sells competing products 
or lacks financial strength which limits sales and could influence product/ service quality. 
2.2.2 Contractual Agreements 
Contractual agreements are long-term, non-equity associations between an international acting 
company and an entity in a foreign market. Contractual agreements usually involve the transfer of 
knowledge such as technology, processes, trademarks and human skills (Cateora, Gilly & 
Graham, 2009). 
Young et al (1989) as well as Root (1998) include licensing, franchising, technical agreements, 
management and service contracts, construction and turnkey contracts, contract manufacture and 
co-production agreements. In consistency with Cateora et al (2009) and John (1997) we will 
focus on licensing and franchising only. 
Licensing is a contractual arrangement between two companies located in different countries. The 
foreign licensor transfers rights or resources (patent rights, trademark rights, copyrights and 
product or process know-how) to the local licensee in exchange for a royalty, based on the 
amount of products sold. The licensee usually gains the exclusive rights to create and market a 
product/ service within an agreed geographical area for a certain time period (Young, Hamill, 
Wheeler, & Davies, 1989). The licensor avoids development costs and risks associated with an 
own establishment in a foreign market. This makes licensing a good strategy for companies who 
want to gain a foothold in a foreign market without taking on huge financial commitments. 
According to Cateora et al (2009) licensing is especially favored by small and medium sized 
companies and is often a supplement to exporting or manufacturing not a substitute. Licensing is 
particular effective in low rated countries where risks such as expropriation and implementation 
of trade barriers are high and opens markets which are closed to export and foreign direct 
investments (FDIs). This makes it a very quick and uncomplicated way to enter a new market 
since many governments favor licensing over other entry modes. Additionally Licensing allows 
the licensor to profit from the licensee’s market knowledge. Licensing maybe the least profitable 
way to enter a market but requires also the lowest commitment (Cateora, Gilly & Graham, 2009). 
29 
 
Drawbacks of this entry mode are: loss of control and proprietary technology or knowhow. This 
could end in losing a unique competitive advantage and create a competitor. Finding, supervising 
and inspiring the licensee are the biggest challenges (Cateora, Gilly & Graham, 2009). 
Furthermore licensing slows down experience-curve effects and location economies by shifting 
the production and responsibility to outsiders. 
Franchising: A form of licensing agreement, in which the franchiser provides a standard package 
of products, systems and management services for a franchise fee, usually including a lump-sum 
payment and a share of the franchisee’s profits. The franchisee on the other side brings market 
knowledge, capital and man power to the table. The franchisor often assists with design, 
equipment, organization and marketing of the business (John, 1997). The success factor of this 
form of licensing is the combination of skills, which allows local market adjustments based on 
cultural differences and control retention to a reasonable degree. The idea behind franchising is to 
combine the franchiser’s unique product/ service knowledge with the franchisee’s local market 
knowledge and entrepreneurial spirit. The main advantage compared to the pure form of licensing 
is an increase in control and commitment of the franchisee versus the licensee. (Cateora, Gilly & 
Graham, 2009). The franchisee also profits from training and development of management skills 
incorporated in the franchising contract. Franchising is also a common strategy in domestic 
markets; this experience can be helpful when going abroad (Young, Hamill, Wheeler, & Davies, 
1989). However the time effort is higher than for licensing agreements and the franchisor’s 
agreement is at risk since the franchisee is using the same brand name. 
2.2.3 Strategic International Alliances 
Strategic international alliance (SIA) is a business relationship between two companies or more 
created out of mutual interests. Those shared interests are formulated into a common goal, which 
the strategic alliance tries to accomplish, by combining each other’s value chains. The partners 
share benefits such as control and risk of the joint task and complement each other by reducing 
weaknesses and increasing competitive strength. Reasons for joining a SIA are: fast market entry, 
access to new technology and overcoming political entry barriers. 
International Joint Venture (IJV) is a cross boarder long-term alliance (Dunning, 1993). The 
main difference compared to a strategic international alliance is the establishment of a separate 
legal entity and the fact that all partners are incorporated legal entities (companies, chartered 
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organizations or governments). Moreover a JV is defined by the intent of all involved parties to 
contribute to management and the equity positions held by each partner (Cateora, Gilly & 
Graham, 2009). The partners own a sufficiently large share of equity, so that each of them has 
some degree of influence (Dunning, 1993). An IJV can facilitate the acquisition of technology, 
allows access to resources and knowledge of the host country’s environment and business 
practices, improves a firm’s competitive advantage and reduces political risk through a strong 
partner. Moreover it provides local capital, personal relationships with local suppliers, banks, 
customers, and government officials. The most common reason for IJV is the prohibition of FDIs 
in some developing countries, which makes it a strategy dictated by the government. Furthermore 
an IJV can lead to frustration, when the foreign partner’s strategy conflicts with the local 
partner’s strategy. Therefore picking the right partner is essential, but very difficult (Root, 1998). 
Consortia: The main differences between a consortia and an IJV is that a consortia involves a 
larger number of participants and that they often formed to enter into a country in which none of 
the partners is currently active. 
2.2.4 Ownership 
Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) describes the market entry of a firm in a foreign country 
through investments. FDIs can appear in the form of acquisitions or greenfield investments. 
Which strategy to chose, depends extremely on the market experience and on the firm’s time 
pressure. FDIs are often chosen in order to profit from low-cost labor, it also reduces 
transportation costs, it bypasses import taxes and gains access to technologies or raw material 
(Cateora, Gilly & Graham, 2009). Investors can be divided into three groups: Extractive 
investors, sourcing investors and market investors. Extractive investors invest in the chosen 
country in order to get access to resources, most of their raw materials output is not sold in the 
host country, but to third countries or the home country. Sourcing investors are manufacturing 
products which are, to a large part, exported back to their home country or third countries. The 
main purpose for that are the benefits of cheap labor, energy etc. The Market investors’ goal is to 
penetrate a market through a production facility in the target country (Root, 1998). 
One of the most obvious benefits of full ownership subsidiaries is that the parent company has 
100 percent control and can follow its own strategy without any compromises, which allows the 
company to exploit its competitive advantage to a greater extent. This comes to a high price, in 
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terms of time and money required. The additional resources increase the company’s risk exposure 
and show a higher commitment to the host country. Other drawbacks are high startup costs, a 
long payback period and high exit barriers. However, local production also benefits marketing 
goals such as adapting to local preferences and purchasing power, quicker and deliver more 
reliable product service. 
2.3 Theoretical Frame Work 
We have developed a theoretical framework based on the Uppsala Model and the theories of 
different entry modes presented above. The purpose of the framework is to clarify the critical 
parts of the Uppsala Model and entry modes. The framework forms the analytical tool that we use 
when we analyze the applicability of the Uppsala Model on European SMEs’ internationalization 
processes. To begin with there are five central concepts in the Uppsala Model: 
1. Learning   
2. Knowledge   
3. Uncertainty  
4. Commitment  
5. Risk. 
Learning affects the firm’s knowledge (K) about a new market, which in turn affects the 
perceived level of uncertainty (U). As a decrease in uncertainty lowers the firm’s total level of 
risk, it is likely that it will increase its commitments(C) in both tangible and intangible assets. 
This will again increase the total risk level (R) but at the same time provide a larger base from 
which new knowledge can be acquired. This is how Johanson and Vahlne (1977, 2009) explain 
the incremental order in which they claim firms internationalize. We have combined the risk 
equation (R = C x U) with the new internationalization process model into one chart in order to 
clearly illustrate the relationship between these two parts of the Uppsala Model (Figure 7). 
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Other important concepts in the Uppsala Model are psychic distance and insider ship in relevant 
networks. In the first version of the Uppsala Model more emphasis was put on cultural barriers 
and language barriers between the domestic and foreign market. In the updated model the 
emphasis was shifted, since Johanson and Vahlne believe now that the firm’s network plays a key 
role in the internationalization process of a firm. 
We decided to give the reader a deeper theoretical explanation of the different entry modes, since 
the choice of entry mode is closely linked to a firm’s internationalization processes. Moreover we 
indentified the type of entry mode as a good indicator of commitment, which is a fundamental 
part of the Uppsala Model’s risk equation and the internationalization process model. In the past 
entry modes have been classified in many different ways by different researchers. However there 
is a common tendency between experts to rank the international market entry strategies within a 
certain spectrum. Beginning with simple exporting and ending with the establishment of wholly-
Alserud & Tykesson 2011 based on Johanson & Vahlne, 1977, 2009 
Figure 7: The combination of the internationalization process model and the risk equation 
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Alserud & Tykesson,  2011 based on Root, 1998 
owned subsidiaries. Entry modes are further classified in at least three different classes: export, 
contractual agreements, and sole investments. Our classification presented in sub chapter 2.2 
Entry modes, is based on Cateora, Gilly and Graham who divide entry modes in 4 different 
classes: Exporting, Contractual agreements, Strategic alliances and Ownership (Cateora, Gilly & 
Graham, 2009). The classification could have been chosen differently but to us this seemed to be 
the best fit, since we distinguish between Joint Ventures and wholly owned subsidiaries. To 
summarize our findings from relevant theory, we have plotted the different entry modes on a 
chart, taking into account the degree of commitment, the time required to fully enter the market 
and the risk/control associated with the entry mode in Figure 8. Risk /Control as well as Time 
increase from the left to the right. The level of commitment increases bottom-up. 
 
 
 
To sum up, by combining the Uppsala Model and Entry Modes Theory we aim to increase the 
understanding of the Uppsala Model through implementing a more practical view by using entry 
Figure 8: Entry modes, Risk/Control, Commitment and Time 
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modes as an indicator for commitment. By using this framework and combining it with our 
empirical findings we intend to answer our research questions mentioned in sub chapter 1.4 
Purpose.  
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3 Research Methodology 
In this chapter we will explain which methods we have used in our research and critically discuss 
why those methods were chosen. We will also have a detailed discussion about the data 
collection process. 
3.1 Research Approach 
Our research approach when assessing the applicability of the updated Uppsala Model consists of 
three steps: 
1. To create a theoretical framework based on the Uppsala Model and theories on entry 
modes. This step is necessary to develop and present a fundamental understanding about 
the theory Uppsala Model. 
2. To gather empirical data through interviews that represent the reality of SMEs today and 
their internationalization processes.  
3. To assess the applicability of the presented theory on the empirical findings to increase 
the understanding of the model. 
3.1.1 Deductive Approach 
Theory of research methodology suggests two general 
approaches, inductive and deductive. When performing 
inductive research the researcher starts by studying the 
reality and then tries to develop new theory based on the 
empirical findings. The deductive approach implies that 
the research process begins with the study of existing 
theory. Then the researcher tests the applicability of the 
theory on empirical findings as shown in Figure 9 
(Bryman & Bell, 2003). 
The approach of this paper described in the previous 
section implies that the method used is deductive. First we 
have looked into existing theory about internationalization 
processes in general and then deeper into the Uppsala 
Model. We then developed research questions based on the 
knowledge gained from reviewing the theory and existing criticism of the theory. The research 
Figure 9: The deductive approach 
Bryman & Bell,  2003 
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questions specify the aspects of the theory that have been tested. In the next step we collected 
data of firms’ internationalization processes. After the data was collected and summarized, it was 
compared with the theoretical predictions resulting in a conclusion about the applicability of the 
theory.  
3.2 Data Collection 
When doing research, data is commonly divided into primary and secondary data depending on 
the nature of the source. Primary data is collected directly from the original source whilst 
secondary data has been collected and presented by someone else. This paper mainly relies on 
primary data collected from key actors working in SMEs that are internationalizing. As the 
studied objects are SMEs, access to secondary data is limited. However this has not caused great 
disadvantage to this paper as the purpose relies mainly on information from primary sources. 
3.3 Primary Data 
Primary data have been collected through a number of semi-structured interviews. The three 
SMEs chosen operate on different markets and are no competitors. A total of five interviewees 
and eight interviews create the foundation of the empirical findings on which the analysis is 
based. 
3.3.1 Qualitative Case Studies 
In order to collect the data needed to answer our research question and the purpose of this paper 
we use a qualitative approach. We have chosen to use case studies in our research when gathering 
empirical data. What distinguishes case studies from other methods is that the researcher wants to 
enlighten unique aspects of a specific case, which is well suited to the qualitative approach 
(Bryman & Bell, 2003). As we want to increase the understanding of the Uppsala Model by 
investigating its applicability on SMEs today, we believe case studies to be a well suiting method 
of collecting empirical data about the internationalization process. A quantitative approach 
would, in a greater extent, focus on statistics and it would be harder to capture the softer, cultural 
elements (Bryman & Bell, 2003) of learning, knowledge and uncertainty, which are the 
fundaments of the Uppsala Model.  
All strategies of research include strengths and weaknesses; hence it is central to be aware of the 
difficulties when choosing the approach suiting best to the study (Merriam, 1998). According to 
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Yin (2006) the main criticism of case studies is the lack the rigor of the strategy. It can, for 
example, be a result of carelessness, unsystematic procedures, ambiguous or dubious evidence 
and the findings and conclusions are affected by subjective opinions of the researcher. To 
enhance the credibility of the case study, researchers should therefore be open when reporting 
sources and evidence to avoid the influence of subjective values. There is also a potential 
difficulty of generalizing the findings from case studies. In this thesis we have chosen to use a 
multiple case study including one main case and two smaller ones that will be used to create a 
wider perspective. This will to some extent reduce the risk of non-valid generalization due to a 
higher number of cases. Case studies have often been criticized of being time consuming and 
results being hard to understand. Today there are new technologies and methods that make the 
execution of the studies more convenient and less time-consuming (Yin 2006; Merriam, 1998). 
It is difficult to conduct a qualitative case study, but Merriam (1998) argues, however, that the 
pros outweigh the cons. Case studies allow the analysis of complex phenomena in which several 
variables come into play. Further studies are also based on real events and situations which often 
results in a detailed and holistic description of the phenomenon that can develop the reader's 
experience and knowledge (Bryman & Bell 2003, Merriam 1998). Despite criticism, we have 
chosen to apply the case study research strategy because in our opinion the strengths outweigh 
the weaknesses. Furthermore we believe it is the best choice in order to answer our purpose. 
3.4 Interviews 
Since we want to find out what factors have led to the studied firms’ processes of 
internationalization, we believe it is necessary to collect information about the individuals’ 
reflections, opinions and personal experiences of the process. To be able to access this kind of 
information interviews are considered a suitable method (Thyer, 2009). Interviews can be 
structured into three levels of structure, unstructured, semi-structured and structured. The degree 
of structure affects how much the interviewer will influence the interviewee and her answers, e.g. 
through the choice of questions. In a more qualitative approach of research the researcher is 
interested in the opinions and interests, and therefore the topics, or sub-topics, of discussion will 
be left to the interviewee to decide on to a greater extent. If the interviewee deviates from the 
interview guide or predetermined order of questions we consider this as good since the answers 
are more natural and less affected by the researcher’s agenda. During the interview there is a 
38 
 
possibility of coming up with new questions making qualitative interviews more flexible. In a 
quantitative approach of research, structured interviews are used. Questions are then 
predetermined and answers that fall outside of the researchers interests are considered as noise. 
Questions and answers have to be standardized, otherwise reliability and validity will be at risk 
(Bryman & Bell, 2003). 
We are making a qualitative study and therefore we can choose between unstructured and semi-
structured interviews. Unstructured interviews are more like an ordinary discussion where the 
interviewer does not guide the interviewee but instead lets the interviewee associate freely to a 
more general theme. This approach is better fitted if the researcher wants to get a general view or 
an increased understanding of the thoughts of the interviewee without affecting him or her. 
However, if there is a predetermined theme and a more narrow focus, semi-structured interviews 
are more suitable. Also if there are several interviewers involved in the research, semi-structured 
interviews secure comparability (Bryman & Bell, 2003). Since we know what questions we want 
the interviews to focus on and we divided the interviews between us, we will perform semi-
structured interviews.  
3.4.1 Structure of Interviews 
An interview guide (Appendix 3) has been created to direct the interviews to cover the relevant 
topics. The interview guide is based on the purpose of the paper and supported by the research 
questions listed in the introduction. As one of our case study companies differ from the other two 
by being an established international SME, some additional questions have been added to the 
interview guide connected to that company. Besides those additional questions the guides are 
identical to secure comparability. When formulating the questions we have focused on covering 
the relevant aspects of our topic but without forcing any opinions upon the interviewees or 
affecting their perspective when discussing the internationalization process of their company. 
Because of practical restraints, the interviews have been performed both face-to-face, over 
telephone and e-mail. The interviews done face-to-face and over telephone lasted between 1.5-2.5 
hours each. The total duration of the interviews was approximately ten hours. All telephone and 
face-to-face interviews have been recorded to assure that important information was not lost. We 
took notes during and after all interviews, except the ones via e-mail. The interviews are 
presented in Appendix 4a, 4b, 6, 7. In most cases we did one introductory interview, which was 
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followed by a second one and one last complementing interview to secure the quality and depth 
of the answers. In accordance with the recommendations in Bryman and Bell (2003) it has been 
our goal for all the interviews to be performed during calm circumstances where the risk of 
interruption and distraction were minimized. In all the interviews the native language of the 
interviewee has been used to assure their comfort and accuracy in their answers. There is always 
a risk of important points being lost when translated. We believe to have kept this risk low by 
thoroughly discussing the translations. Additionally, to ensure that the answers have been 
understood correctly, we have e-mailed follow-up questions and the translated versions of the 
interviews to the interviewees for confirmation. In this way we have attempted to assure that the 
initial points are well understood even after translation. 
One of the interviews was done via e-mail due to the interviewee’s preferences. The interviews 
consist of an exchange of eight e-mails the final answers are attached in Appendix 5. The first e-
mail was introductory with basic information about the scope of the thesis and the goal of the 
interview. The second e-mail
 
included a list of important definitions and basically the same 
questions as in the interview guide. We then sent a third e-mail to collect complementing 
information that was not included in the prior answers and one additional e-mail confirming the 
answers. 
By request of the companies in our case study we have chosen to anonymize the companies and 
interview partners. Consequently we avoid a leak of sensitive and firm specific information. The 
companies are named Company X, Y and Z. The interviewees are presented under fictitious 
names to make the interviews easier to follow while keeping the real names protected. 
3.4.2 Selection 
The selection of our companies is based on a fundamental element of this paper’s purpose, 
namely internationalizing SMEs. Our case study consists of three companies. The first company 
(Compnay X) in our study is a large SMEs with international presence. The other two companies 
(Company Y and Z) that have been studied are small and recently founded, but also in the 
process of internationalization. The material of Company X is the most extensive due to the fact 
that the company, compared to the other two companies in our case study, has the longest history 
of internationalization and the largest international exposure at present time. Company X is 
therefore the main focus of this paper. Findings from the two other companies will have a 
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supportive function. They will support, show differences and add nuances to the empirical 
finings. Clearly all of the objects in our case studies are relevant to our purpose as they are all 
SMEs and are all internationalizing. Naturally there is also an element of accessibility in the 
selection of case study companies. This being said, we firmly believe that the selected companies 
fit our research area and the purpose of our paper perfectly and thus the credibility of the paper is 
not hurt. 
3.4.3 Presentation of the Companies in the Case Studies  
Company X is a Swedish based family owned company. Producing and selling light fixtures 
since the early 1940’s, the company entered into many international countries and grew to 
become a successful and quiet big SME, with total revenues of around 50 million EUR and 100 
employees worldwide. Company X is currently selling their products to 18 European countries. 
Their main markets in terms of sales are: Germany, Sweden and England. Since the sales in 
Germany exceeded the sales in the home country of Company X and significant sales portion 
come from other Scandinavian countries as well as England. Therefore we can truly speak of a 
very international company. The company started out with producing in Sweden and shifted its 
production a couple of times around the globe, which makes it interesting from an 
internationalization point of view (Company home page, 2011 and Appendix 4a, 4b and 5). 
Company Y is a Swedish consultancy firm offering courses in leadership. In 2008 one of the 
entrepreneurs came to the conclusion that his previous company, selling the same service as 
Company Y, did not serve the demand in an optimal way. Together with two partners he started 
the new company in 2009. Together they form the executive team responsible of all strategically 
and practical decisions and actions of the company. The company owns patented programs of 
education, which are the foundation of the services sold by the consultants. The consultants are 
educated by the executive team and then work independently, selling and performing courses in 
leadership. The income from their sales is the divided between the consultants and the company. 
Courses are held at the offices of the customers and take between 8-12 months. According to the 
vision published on the website of the company, the firm aims to be considered as one of the top 
five actors in educating leaders on the Swedish market. Company Y has license agreements with 
partners in Belgium, France, Germany and Norway. The French licensee is besides France, also 
responsible for educating consultants in Brussels as well as for the establishment of a licensee 
agreement in Germany. The licensee in Norway has the right to sell their services in Norway and 
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on the boarder between Norway and Sweden. They also have the right to follow their customers 
into Sweden (Company home page, 2011 and Appendix 6). 
Company Z is a German based family owned start-up company. The company founded in 2009, 
currently has ten employees. The company’s revenues are moving within the lower area of the 
European Commission’s definition of SMEs. Company Z sells road vehicles in Germany and 
four other European countries, namely: Austria, Switzerland, Spain and Sweden. The company is 
still in the beginning of their internationalization process since the firm’s main revenue flow 
comes from the home market. Production is located in Asia; Company Z works together with 
different contracted factories on this continent. When taking a look at the management their 
international heritage, education and working experience sticks out. All key managers own a 
business degree in international management (Company home page, 2011 and Appendix 7). 
3.4.4 Interviewees of Companies X,Y,Z  
3.4.4.1 Company X 
The interviews undertaken in order to get a deeper inside into Company X were made with Mr. 
Brolin and Mr. Ravelli. Mr. Brolin became the CEO of the German sales and storage subsidiary 
in 1990 after working in the same company as a general manager for seven years. He has owned 
this position for 21 years today and has been with Company X for 28 years in total. Before that, 
he worked for different companies in Sweden and Germany as a Sales Manager and Head of 
Sales for a couple of years.  
Mr. Ravelli owns a degree in Business Administration (Högre Företagsekonomisk Examen). 
After he graduated in the beginning of the1960’s Ravelli worked in different companies in 
various management positions. Before he was employed by Company X as a controller in 1986, 
he worked as a CFO for another Swedish company. In 1989 Ravelli was appointed Executive 
Vice President and in 1992 CEO of the whole concern. He stayed CEO until 1996, then left the 
company and came back as CEO for another three-year period (2001-2003). 
The long affiliation with the company and their positions within the company make both Ravelli 
and Brolin ideal interview partners. Moreover they complement each other in terms of time, 
location and position. Ravelli, who steered the internationalization process, being the CEO of the 
concern and Brolin quite autonomously within this framework putting strategy into action. 
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Brolin’s task was also to expand in further countries from Germany. Moreover Brolin was 
heavily involved in all internationalization processes of the firm except for Scandinavia. 
3.4.4.2 Company Y 
We interviewed Mr. Dahlin, the executive chairman and informal CEO of Company Y. As the 
informal CEO he is the one in control of the internationalization decisions. Due to the small size 
of the company he is in charge of both the development of all strategies and their implementation. 
This makes the most suitable person working at the company to interview. He has been working 
at the company since the establishment in 2009 and is one of the owners. Mr. Dahlin own’s a 
MBA and has been working in leading positions in both the Swedish public and private sector, 
mostly in the fields of finance and vocational training. He has also been a board member of 
several European organizations with members from all across Europe.  
3.4.4.3 Company Z 
At Company Z we interviewed the CEO Patrik Andersson and the Marketing and Sales Director 
Daniel Andersson, both in their mid twenties. Each of the two brothers owns a business degree in 
International Management and additionally has a very international background. Both are in 
charge of the internationalization process and are therefore the right contact persons. They 
worked in other companies in middle management position during and shortly after their studies 
and now took over positions of high responsibility. 
3.5 Secondary Data 
The information gained from secondary data is not central in our research. It has been used 
mainly to serve the purpose of providing background information of the companies that have 
been studied and to ensure that they fit into the definition of SMEs. The background information 
was collected from the companies’ websites and annual reports or from the interviews and there 
should be no reason for this information to be inaccurate.  
3.5.1 Criticism of Sources of Theory  
The main theory used in this paper is the Uppsala Model by Johanson and Vahlne. Most sources 
of the Uppsala Model are written by the original authors and publicized in major European 
business journals. In addition we have looked into some of the more influential reviews 
criticizing the model. This has made us more aware of the shortcomings of the model and gave us 
a  more complete understanding of the model. The vast majority of our sources are from highly 
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respected business journals leading us to trust in their credibility. Other sources for information 
are various textbooks in the relevant field, of which credibility we find no reason to doubt.  
3.6 Choice of Presentation of Empirical Findings 
The findings from the interviews have been presented in order of topic and divided by company. 
As the companies differ in character we believe this to be important. If the presentation instead 
would have been based only on specific topics areas and companies, this would have resulted in a 
lower traceability of our empirical findings. Even if the chosen way of presenting the results 
makes it more difficult to make an immediate comparison between the different companies’ 
answers, we do believe to solve this issue, by a comparing discussion in the analysis. 
We have not presented the answers in their actual order due to the fact that several answers 
repeated important points and were closely linked to each other. As the interviews were only 
semi-structured the interviewees often also returned to a previous answer. This made it appealing 
to merge some of the answers since they are closely correlated. To make the results gathered 
from the answers more structured, they were assorted to fit the  order of a broader topic. Finally, 
the answers have been rewritten and presented in a story telling form to make them easier to 
understand. The risk of important points being lost has thereby been minimized. 
3.7 Choice of Analytical Method 
In the analysis we have applied our empirical findings on the theory to be able to discuss its 
applicability. Some factors that are discussed only briefly in the theory have been emphasized to 
stress their importance in the empirical findings. Factors that were not predicted in theory but 
have been prominent in the empirical findings have been presented to develop the theory. We 
have chosen this analytical method because it answers to the purpose of our paper. 
The structure of the analysis is based on the research questions and the theoretical framework. 
The disadvantage of this structure is that all points are not discussed and analyzed individually. 
As a consequence not all critical factors have been discussed equally thorough. On the other 
hand, the chosen method of analysis allows the reader to follow our discussion easier. Discussing 
each identified critical factor separately would be very extensive and time consuming for the 
reader. The aspects of the relationship between concepts would also be less clear and it would 
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result in much repetition, since many items are complementary. For these reasons we believe the 
chosen method of analysis to be the most suitable. 
3.8 Reliability and Validity 
When discussing the quality of economic research it is often measured in terms of reliability and 
validity. Reliability is concerning if the results from the research would be the same if the study 
was repeated. Validity is possible to divide into different sub groups but the basic idea is that 
conclusions based on the research should be logical and based on an actual causal relationship. 
However when using a qualitative approach of research, concepts as validity and reliability are 
difficult to apply since they suppose a possibility to find one complete picture of the social reality 
(Bryman & Bell, 2003). In qualitative research there is no such thing as a complete picture and 
instead Bryman and Bell (2003) state that there might be more than one and usually several 
descriptions of this social reality. Instead of using validity and reliability they (2003) suggest the 
use of equivalent but better suiting concepts, such as credibility and authenticity. 
Credibility includes several criteria, which are all used in qualitative research e.g. concepts as 
transferability, dependability and confirmability. Transferability is not the same in qualitative 
and quantitative studies. In a quantitative study the research will be broader in nature and its 
results will preferably be easier to generalize. In a qualitative study, however, the research will be 
more narrowly focused to a specific group in a specific context. In further contrast to the 
quantitative approach, the results and descriptions of the observations will be fuller and more 
detailed (Bryman & Bell, 2003). Our research will add to the database of findings about the 
applicability of the Uppsala Model in different contexts and hence to some degree increase the 
total amount of understanding of the model. Dependability is secured by making a thorough 
presentation of all the steps in the research process. This includes for example stating the purpose 
of the paper as well as the purpose of individual interviews and explaining the interview process 
(Bryman & Bell, 2003). We try to ensure the dependability mostly in this section of the paper by 
clearly stating our research method and relevant considerations. Regarding confirmability it is 
first of all important to realize that it is impossible to reach a complete objectivity in this field of 
research (Bryman & Bell 2003). Keeping this in mind, we want to assure that we have acted and 
executed our research in god faith. We do not believe us to have any predetermined thoughts 
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about the theme of study nor do we believe us to have anything to gain from affecting the results 
in either way. 
Lastly, in addition to the criteria mentioned above, there is the concept of authenticity. It regards 
the question of if the researcher gives a fair picture of the opinions and thoughts of the 
interviewees. In accordance with the recommendations of Bryman and Bell (2003) we let the 
persons interviewed confirm that there were no misunderstandings and the results of the 
interviews were reported in an accurate way. There is also a risk of the findings being biased 
because of a too narrow and homogeneous group of interviewees (Bryman & Bell, 2003). As two 
of the studied companies in this paper are small, one employing four persons and the other ten 
persons, we do not see this as an issue. To further assure the authenticity, we have interviewed 
two persons each from Company X and Company Z. One present and one former executive of 
Company X have been interviewed. Since Company Y has only four employees of which the 
person interviewed is the one dealing with the internationalization processes there was no 
possibility to interview further qualified persons. 
3.8.1 Methodical Ethics 
In this paper we have strived to follow recommendations about methodical ethics. Bryman and 
Bell (2003) lists four categories to consider. The first one is avoiding any harm to the 
participants. The second is informed consent, which in most cases concerns if the participants are 
aware of being observed and thus not relevant for this paper. The third is concerning the 
protection of privacy and the fourth is about false pretenses. We are confident to have avoided 
any ethical faults in our paper. By keeping the companies and interviewees anonymous they will 
not have to feel personally exposed in any way. Moreover, the interviewees have approved the 
questions in our interviews, as well as our presentation of the answers. 
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4 Empirical Findings 
4.1 Company X 
Subsequently a review of Company X’s internationalization steps from 1970s to today and the 
presentation of further answers in the interview follow. We thereby focus on the countries of 
production and main countries of sales. 
4.1.1 Production 
Company X produced its light fixtures in Sweden until the early 1970’s. Then the company 
started to shift its production due to the raising production cost in west European countries 
between 1980 and 2000. Company X was one of the first within its industry to follow this 
strategy, taking on a pioneer role. This process was pushed by a manager who was recruited from 
a big Swedish furniture manufacturer. He used his experience and know-how and persuaded 
investors and top management to shift production towards the DDR, Poland, and the Far East. 
After testing different production modes in different countries such as domestic production, fully 
owned production facilities in Eastern Europe and Joint Ventures, Company X decided to 
outsource production almost entirely. Today Company X owns only one production facility in 
Hungary producing 5 percent of its output. The remaining 95 percent are produced in China by 
using contractual production agreements. 
4.1.2 Countries of Sales 
As mentioned earlier Company X is selling to around 18 different European countries at the 
moment. The most important markets in terms of sales are Germany, Sweden, England and 
Norway.  
4.1.2.1 Nordic Countries 
Company X early started exporting to other Nordic markets such as Norway, Finland, and 
Denmark. In the late 1970’s, early 1980’s, Company X introduced agents in Norway and Finland. 
Norway was approached first, due to the closeness in terms of distance, language and culture. The 
task was to find an agent who would be responsible for the whole country. The appointed Agent 
had along with some other customers purchased our products for some years before he became 
our agent. The partnership with the Norwegian agency ended in 2000, due to dissatisfaction on 
both sides. As a response a legal sales entity was created in Norway. Company X founded a legal 
entity, because of customs issues which appeared since Norway is not part of the EU. Two 
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former employees of the sales agency were hired and put in charge of the sales subsidiary. In 
Finland Company X tried out different sales agents until they established an own sales force in 
the form of a sales office in 2000.
4
 Where as the market entry in Norway was very successful, the 
results in Finland did not fulfill the company’s expectations. According to Mr. Ravelli the results 
were quit bad. Even after changing agents results did not improve. Therefore the decision was 
made to form a sales office with own sells personnel. The situation in Denmark was a bit 
different. According to Mr. Ravelli this is because, Denmark has an experienced trading culture 
since many hundred years. Many potential clients were already importing products directly from 
Asian producers at prices which Company X could not compete with. Some products have been 
exported from Sweden to Denmark but the sales generated are very low. Because of these reasons 
an increased involvement in the form of a sales offices or sales subsidiary was never considered. 
4.1.2.2 Germany and England 
Germany and England were the next markets to enter. Between 1980 and 1983 Company X was 
working with a sales agent. The products were still stored in Sweden. During that time the 
company had revenues of about one mil. SEK in Germany, overall sales were 25 mil. SEK at this 
time. Germany was from all markets in Europe the most interesting to Company X, mainly due to 
the number of inhabitants, its geographical position and cultural closeness to Sweden. However 
the firm wanted to keep its investment and commitment low and carefully test the market. 
Especially since an external advisor made a market analysis which resulted in a discouraging 
advice not too enter the German market. The German chamber of commerce saw only a little 
probability for Company X to be successful on the German market. In 1983 a sales subsidiary 
(GmbH) and a warehouse was opened. Today the company has worldwide sales of around 50 
million EUR with most of their sales coming from Germany. “You could say that the German 
Chamber of Commerce was wrong.” (Brolin, 2011). The German sales subsidiary had a special 
role in the internationalization process of Company X. Its task was to gain a foothold in adjacent 
international markets, such as Holland, Belgium and Austria, and later support the sales agents, 
sales offices as well as sales subsidiaries by using their experience of the German market. The 
management of Company X was persuaded that the cultural barriers and distance was easier to 
overcome from Germany than from Sweden. Just shortly after entering the German market 
                                                          
4
 The difference between a sales office and a sales subsidiary is that a sales office is not a legal entity. The 
employees are paid by the parent company and the business premises are either rent or owned by the parent 
company. 
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Company X started to work with an agent in England, who in 1985 became the CEO of the new 
sales subsidiary (Ltd) a warehouse was acquired too. 
4.1.2.3 France 
In 1995 the same mode, sales subsidiary (SARL) with warehouse, was chosen to enter France. 
However this time they entered the market without testing it through collaboration with an agent 
prior to increasing its commitment. In 2002 the SARL was closed and replaced by an agent. After 
another one to two years the business relation was broken down. Afterwards, a sales office was 
established and a former employee of the SARL was hired. Since goals still were not met until 
2006 the sales personnel is now operating from Germany. 
4.1.2.4 Poland and Hungary -  from Producing to Sales 
Poland and Hungary are markets in which the company tried to gain a foothold after first 
establishing production facilities. However they initially entered those countries in order to 
decrease production cost. The commitment was higher in Poland since a sales subsidiary and 
warehouse existed between 1980 and 2005. However sales in both markets stayed on a fairly low 
level and are only generated through simple exporting. In Hungary sales is totally independent 
from the production facility. 
4.1.2.5 Sales Offices 
The difference between a sales office and a sales subsidiary is that a sales office is not a legal 
entity. The employees are paid by the parent company and the business premises are either rent or 
owned by the parent company. In The Netherlands Company X worked together with an agent 
from 1985 to 1988. Afterwards a sales office with show-room was established in 1988. Currently 
other sales offices exist in France and Finland. Agents are currently in place in Italy and Austria. 
In Switzerland Company X had two different agents for nineteen years but is operating from 
Germany since 2009. Additionally to those countries already named sales is generated through 
exporting to: The Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria. 
4.1.2.6 Countries of Withdrawal 
Interestingly Company X only withdrew from three markets in their history of 
internationalization: Belgium, Spain and North America. The firm left Belgium and Spain after 
an involvement of three years in both countries. According to Mr. Brolin the reasons for not 
being successful in those countries were to a large part the differences in business culture closely 
followed by trusting the wrong people. Considering the three year involvement in the USA and 
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Canada, Mr. Brolin identifies the overall market size and the strong need for product adjustments, 
due to technological differences, as the main factors which influenced the firm’s decision to 
retreat from this market. According to him the trade-off between commitment (money and time), 
and risk was not in balance. The firm was not willing to increase the commitment sufficiently 
because this would have exceeded the company’s comfortable risk level. The firm decided to 
focus on the expansion within Europe instead: “We wanted to get stronger in countries in which 
lower sales, particularly in countries in Eastern Europe, before we enter new markets outside of 
Europe. Generally we prefer EU members to none EU-members; however this is not a knock-out 
criterion.” (Brolin, 2011). This strategy is still followed by the company. 
4.1.2.7 France and Belgium Countries of Special Challenge 
Mr. Brolin there are special challenges for foreign companies in France and Belgium.  He 
believes that the French and the Belgian more than other nationalities prefer to purchase products 
or services from local companies. He therefore suggests the use of a domestic name, the 
establishment of a legal entity and hiring local employees. In the 90’s Company X was 
considering to by a French company in order to increase their commitment and overcome cultural 
barriers. He advises others to rather go with an acquisition than a Greenfield investment when 
entering these markets. Moreover he considers the language and cultural barriers in those markets 
as high for a Swedish or German based company. 
4.1.3 Reasons behind the Choice of Markets 
Company X tried to enter close markets, in terms of distance and culture, first. The firm started 
out with Scandinavian countries and then after obtaining a comfortable size attacked the German 
and English market almost simultaneously. The German and English market was much bigger 
than the Scandinavian markets and therefore very attractive. The fact, that English and German 
were spoken by most of the company’s top managers and business owners was facilitating the 
decision. However the main driving force behind the decision to enter international markets was 
growth. The top management’s international experience pushed them abroad not only to enter 
new markets but also in order to reduce production cost. 
4.1.4 Choice of International Sales Strategy 
Usually company X approaches new markets as described subsequently. The company starts by 
doing an internal market analysis, after demand in a new market arises; export increases or the 
board of directors decides to investigate new markets due to their attractiveness. Such a market 
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analysis contains: desk research, acquiring knowledge through the Swedish Trade council and 
local Chambers of Commerce, travelling through the country in order to scan potential 
competitors and their products as well as querying customers located in those markets. According 
to Mr. Brolin, the Internet has positively influenced the internal market research. More 
information about competitors is quicker to access and available to a larger extent, which helps a 
company to make the right decisions. In some cases external market analysis were actually 
bought from the Swedish Trade council or foreign partners to Swedish lawyers in order to 
complement the own analysis. The second step is to enter the market with an agent, testing the 
market to a further extend. Thirdly the company looks for the right person for the job, ideally a 
Swedish speaking person who knows the culture and markets of the domestic and foreign 
country. This person is then either implemented as head agent or CEO of the sales subsidiary. 
When implementing an agent, most of the contacts were made through the agent himself. It is 
important to find an agent with a good contact net. When investing in an own sales force, the 
most important factor at the beginning is to find a reliable person to employ. The next step is to 
use his or her network and integrate it into the firm. 
Using agents to enter a market is a good way to start the penetration of a market without heavy 
investments. However it must be noticed, that this choice could cause the company higher costs 
in the future, when it decides to “buy out” the agent in order to create an own sales force, being 
able to further use the network and contacts created by the agent. Another drawback when 
working with agents is that your market knowledge growth is limited. 
According to Mr. Brolin, under certain circumstances and in specific countries it is better to keep 
working with an agent than building up an own sales subsidiary. It is not always possible to 
improve sales figures with an owned sales subsidiary even though investments will be higher. If 
you end the association with an agent, you will always lose clients, depending on how strong the 
agent is. It is also not always possible to make the former agent head of a new sales subsidiary, 
since he might prefer to stay independent. This is especially true, when the agent has a big 
product portfolio, strong revenue streams and numerous employees. 
Mr. Ravelli points out that without looking specifically at a certain market he believes that there 
are strong benefits coming along with establishing an own sales force. However, a company 
aiming to enter several markets during a short time normally does not have the recourses to set up 
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an own sales force in every market. He goes on by explaining how important it is for a firm to set 
priorities, by pooling its resources and focus on the most promising markets, keeping in mind that 
a trade-off between the number of countries to enter and the chosen entry modes exists. He 
suggests to first take a look at the size of the market and how quickly the investment is expected 
to amortize. The pay back horizon of your investments is critical and should be realistically 
chosen. He expects a company introducing a new product into a foreign market not to break-even 
before three to five years after their market entry. This depends of course also on the entry mode. 
Mr. Ravelli concluded this topic with the words: “The higher your uncertainty about a market is, 
the lower your investments in this market should be.”  
4.1.5 Critical Issues when Entering a Market 
Mr. Ravelli and Brolin point out that a good investigation of potential markets is critical in order 
to be able to invest carefully. Thereby the following aspects need to be considered: competitors, 
demand, market infrastructure, payment behavior, price level, competing products, price levels, 
special traditions and the overall structure of the market. 
4.1.6 Focus on the Domestic Market 
Both Ravelli and Brolin agree that a company’s center of attention should always be its domestic 
market. Possessing a strong position in the home market is essential when going abroad. It is 
difficult to fight on many frontiers at the same time. Although many possibilities might seem 
tempting, only close and unique opportunities to gain foreign sales should be considered 
detecting. Especially when a company is still in its starting phase it will always take more time to 
grow sales in foreign countries than in your home country. This is due to translation and 
adjustments of documents and courses of actions from the native to the foreign language and 
environment. Examples for that are: home pages, price strategies, price lists, legal issues, 
marketing campaigns etc. that need to be bended in order to fit the foreign market. 
4.1.7 The Impact of Time 
According to the two interviewees from Company X, trade barriers in the 70’s and 80’s made it 
very difficult to sell products to clients in other countries within Europe, without establishing a 
legal entity. This has changed a lot due to the strengthening of the EU. Technological 
development aided to facilitate the communication between different business units, cooperating 
firms and a firm’s clients. Moreover the Schengen agreement and the introduction of low cost 
airlines have improved the travelling situation enormously. 
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4.1.8 The Network of a Firm 
According to Mr. Brolin, the biggest influence the firm’s network had on sales and market choice 
came from international clients, who made Company X sell products to subsidies or partners of 
those clients located in foreign countries. Company X did not have any revenue streams from 
those markets before. Additionally employees who had been acquired through the firm’s network 
had a huge impact on the firm’s internationalization strategy, e.g. the manager poached from the 
Swedish furniture manufacturer. 
4.1.9 Physical Distance 
The drawbacks of long physical distances between countries have decreased over time. 
Infrastructure has improved especially in Eastern Europe and it is easier to move goods, capital 
and people within the European Union and the rest of the world except for the US. Moreover the 
Internet has become a good substitute to the telephone and fax messaging. All these aspects allow 
a firm to store goods in fewer countries and decreases the need for setting up companies in every 
country of sales. However, Mr. Brolin and Mr. Ravelli alert not to neglect or underestimate 
physical distance. Tax authorities, which can cause issues, are still placed locally and long 
distance flights remain long distance flights. 
4.1.10 Psychic Distance 
Mr. Brolin believes that a higher understanding of different cultures exists today and that cultural 
barriers and other obstacles to trade between European countries are lower than they were a 
couple of decades ago. However Mr. Ravelli does not believe that the strengthening of the EU 
had an impact on how business is done between countries. According to him, “All business is 
local. In order to be successful, you need to know your markets and adapt to their specific rules.” 
4.1.11 Experiential Knowledge versus Objective Knowledge 
The interviewees consider experiential knowledge as more valuable than objective knowledge 
since it is more accurate. However the downturn with experiential knowledge is that it is more 
costly to acquire? On the other hand, objective knowledge can help you avoid buying more costly 
experiential knowledge. 
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4.2 Company Y 
4.2.1 The Internationalization Process 
Initially, the management team was not interested in a foreign expansion at this early stage. 
Instead they wanted, and still want, to focus on building a strong position on the domestic 
market. Therefore, they have not made any effort to seek opportunities abroad. Instead Company 
Y began entering foreign markets because individuals who were interested in selling the 
company’s programs contacted them. If Company Y had not been pulled into the new markets, 
they would have delayed their internationalization process. "The reason we do this now is 
because it is a cheap and almost risk-free source of revenue." Mr. Dahlin says the executive 
chairman. 
The choice of entry mode has, in all markets, been to license the right to sell the programs in the 
specific country. Each licensee is responsible of the operations on their market, including e.g. 
translation, cultural adjustments, sales and execution while. In return, Company Y receives a 
fixed income for every program sold. By choosing licensing, Mr. Dahlin believes that they take 
no, or very low risk as they invest very little capital into the market and dedicate very little time 
to the process of internationalization. He stresses the importance of the fact that they are not tied 
to the end customer legally and commitment is therefore very low. He explains that money spent 
on researching foreign markets is practically zero. Company Y has not made any independent 
assessments of the foreign markets and has almost no knowledge of the new markets, neither 
objective or from experience. Instead, they rely entirely on the licensees’ knowledge of the 
markets. At several occasions, Mr. Dahlin mentions that the three-member management team 
does not have the time or resources to enter new markets in any other way than the chosen one, 
“They are simply to busy establishing the company on the domestic market.” 
Mr. Dahlin explains that he believes that a subsidiary would have meant that they would have to 
commitment both more time and money. They would have to spend hours traveling to the 
different countries to participate on board meetings, meeting employees etc. Also, there is the 
cost of translating legal documents and financial reports. This makes the costs of both start-up 
and running of the subsidiary very high. Mr. Dahlin’s experience from boards of European 
organization makes him believe that cultural differences always will make processes more 
problematic, and even more if they would enter markets through subsidiaries. As the 
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internationalization process would also be more time consuming, it would also require more 
resources.  
4.2.2 The Choice of Markets and the Firm’s Network 
The Mr. Dahlin explains that “[t]he network of the management team was the only factor 
influencing the choice of markets to enter.” The foreign actors had earlier been in contact with 
either the management team or the programs. Because they saw great potential in the programs, 
they became interested in selling them in their native market. Before agreeing to a contract, the 
potential licensees have been researched and evaluated. If they seemed genuine and showed that 
they will be able to sell the program in a good and credible, they got the license agreement. The 
Mr. Dahlin emphasized that the fact that they are familiar with the foreign licensees makes it 
easier to work together and to trust each other, and hence the internationalization process 
becomes less complicated. For example, the licensee in France is Swedish but has lived in Paris 
during the last 25 years. According to the Mr. Dahlin, this is of essential importance, making 
negotiations more straightforward and the collaboration more effortless. 
4.2.3 Physical and Psychic Distance 
When discussing the issue of psychic distance, the Mr. Dahlin first explained that the programs 
they sell are almost independent of cultural differences that might exist between markets. To be 
able to use them in new contexts, they only need to be translated and a couple of examples need 
to be replaced in order to increase local understanding. This makes the cultural barrier, caused by 
the nature of the programs low. Their choice to use licensing as they enter markets makes cultural 
barriers less important. Since the licensee is responsible of her own market and performance, the 
degree of interaction between actors on different markets is kept low. If they however, were to 
actively search for new markets they would most likely begin in countries close to Sweden 
because of convenience. Consequently, Mr. Dahlin argues that cultural barriers and long 
distances has a low impact on the operations when choosing licensing It would however affect 
the choice of markets to enter when approaching markets that they are not pulled into.  
4.2.4 Future Strategies 
The EC believes that the best strategy for entering new markets in the future is the same as the 
one they use today, namely to begin with licensees. Even if they in the future have enough ability 
to commit more resources when first entering a new market, licenses enable them to test the 
market without taking any risk. In this way they also get to know the individual partners and to 
55 
 
build trust without creating any legal ties. 
Mr. Dahlin believes that they might buy into the foreign licensees in the future the. This would 
allow them to get greater access to the licensee’s networks and profits. He realizes that the cost of 
buying a part of a licensee might make the acquisition unprofitable and that it would require less 
of an initial investment to co-finance the licensee in the phase of start up. However, he believes 
the risk of committing resources early on to be too high. 
4.3 Company Z 
4.3.1 The Network of a Firm 
Company Z is in the beginning of its internationalization process. The first contacts to foreign 
agents were generated through a friend of the firm’s owners, the CEO of another firm. The 
friend’s firm is not operating in the same value chain or located in the same industry still, or 
maybe due to that fact the CEO was more than happy to help out. Three out of the four foreign 
countries Company Z is operating in were approached through agents introduced by this contact 
(Austria, Switzerland and Sweden). In Spain, the fourth country the firm is currently operating in, 
a leasing agreement exists with a firm, founded only for this purpose. The person in charge of the 
Spanish firm was called to attention of Company Z by a mutual friend and fellow student of 
Company Z’s owners. 
4.3.2 Reasons behind the Choice of Markets and Entry Mode 
As mentioned above, according to Daniel and Patrik Andersson Company Z’s network had a 
huge impact on the market selection. Additionally, due to the limited resources of start-ups, 
Company Z favored entry modes with lower dedication in terms of money and time. Therefore 
the company chose to enter foreign markets generally through agents and in the case of countries 
of high potential with leasing agreements. Low commitment in foreign markets is becomes even 
more attractive since the main focus of the company is still its home market, due to the size of the 
German market and the firm’s competitive position within the market. The company still has 
potential to gain further market share within its home market, therefore the company’s strategy is 
to approach those countries which are very close and important markets on the long run and only 
when very good opportunities present themselves. 
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4.3.3 Choice of International Sales Strategy 
The two brothers interviewed agrees in that it is best to begin entering markets close to your 
home market in terms of their location, their culture and their language. Further, if entering 
countries more dissimilar to the domestic market it is important to make sure that you have the 
knowledge about these markets is available in your firm’s network. Patrik and Daniel Andersson 
generally agree with following an incremental order, starting with low commitment and then 
steadily increasing commitment as uncertainty decreases. However they doubt that it is always 
beneficiary to steadily increase the commitment in a market. Since Company Z’s production is 
located in Asia because of the technological head start in Asia concerning these types of products 
and the lower producing cost, they believe it is very unlikely that Company Z will move 
production to its home market or other markets of sales even when uncertainty is further reduced. 
On the other hand they have no interest in selling their products to Asia. 
According to the two brothers it is also not necessarily the case that an increase in commitment 
leads to an increase in revenues or profits. Often changes of foreign engagement are difficult and 
lead to a loss of clients. Especially in countries which high psychic and physical distance you 
should be cautious with Greenfield investments, if the company is lacking knowledge. The 
brothers believe that knowing the right contact person is what has the biggest influence on the 
decision of commitment. It should preferably be a person who knows both the domestic and the 
foreign country’s culture and language. Being able to trust this person and the other way around 
is the essential foundation of a long and successful business relationship. If you think that you 
have found the right person for the job, you are willing to put more effort into recruiting this 
person. If goals are not met, they first try to help out by increasing their involvement, if that does 
not help they reduce their time efforts and watch out for new opportunities. Other important 
sources that influence the decision of commitment are having the knowledge about new markets 
and the firm’s financial situation. They rank knowledge second since enough knowledge needs to 
be acquired in order to overcome one’s natural risk aversion; this is individual to every firm. 
According to them, how detailed the knowledge needs to be also depends a lot on how good the 
personal relation to the country is. 
4.3.4 Experiential- and Objective Knowledge 
Since Company Z is a start-up Patrik and Daniel Andersson believe that their experiential 
knowledge within foreign markets is limited and can therefore only be acquired costly. Therefore 
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many early internationalization decisions were based on objective knowledge (desk research) and 
experiential knowledge in the form of their personal networks as well as through investigating the 
market on site. With unlimited resources available the two would always prefer experiential 
knowledge to objective knowledge since it is more accrued. 
4.3.5 Background of Top Management 
The background of our top management has had a huge impact on Company Z’s 
internationalization strategies so far. In all markets they are operating in at least one of the top 
managers know the domestic language of the market. Moreover they explain that they prefer to 
enter markets to which they have closer ties gained through: friends, family, business contacts or 
vacation, even when these markets might not be equally attractive in terms of market size. The 
reason behind that is that Company Z believes understanding the culture of a country and 
speaking its language are major success factors when going abroad. They continue by suggesting, 
“do not try to concur a market being only motivated by sales.” 
4.3.6 The Impact of Time and the Development of New Technologies 
The two brothers believe that the Internet has facilitated the internationalization process of firms 
in many ways. It is much easier to gain information about competitors and demand in foreign 
markets. Some products can very easily be sold over the Internet. However other products of 
higher value are often more difficult to sell over the Internet, in particularly when the products 
are crossing boarders. Furthermore some business models are not intending to sell directly to the 
end consumer. For those companies the Internet is not a true distribution channel or entry mode 
into foreign countries. According to Patrik and Daniel Andersson it is also much easier and 
cheaper to nurse business as well as private contacts, which allows businessmen to keep and 
expand their network. This network often leads to unexpected business opportunities in different 
countries as well as in the home market. Furthermore it helps managers to follow the 
development in foreign countries. 
4.3.7 Physical Distance 
According to Patrik and Daniel Andersson, the world has become a smaller place. Therefore they 
believe that the physical distance is less of a problem, compared to a couple of decades ago. 
However they do not believe that videoconferences, e-mails etc. are full substitutes to face-to-
face meetings. They continue by stressing the importance, that the EU keeps the frontiers open 
for a free movement of citizens and goods. Countries such as Denmark which currently consider 
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re-implementing board controls, risk losing attractiveness. Foreign firms will decrease their 
involvement in those firms, because of the inconvenience that is created artificially. 
4.3.8 Psychic Distance 
Considering psychic distance they believe that the world has become of more intercultural place 
where different cultures more frequently consolidate with each other. This is especially true for 
multi-cultural cities such as New York and Paris. However there are cities in Asia with a couple 
of million inhabitants, where white people are looked at as if they were aliens or superstars. 
Patrik himself experiences that quiet often when travelling through Asia. The opposite seems also 
to be true in less urban regions in the US or Europe. He concludes this topic by saying, “I guess 
what I am trying to say is that cultures are more interlinked today but still far from being united. 
This is probably never going to happen. Many customs and habits from distanced cultures are 
still very odious to other cultures. Therefore top managers spend much time on learning about 
country specific habits and customs.” 
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5 Analysis 
Research question 1: How does psychic and physical distance influence internationalization 
strategies of SMEs in today’s environment? 
The internationalization process of Company X followed the predicted path of the Uppsala 
Model very closely from a geographical and cultural point of view. The company first entered the 
Scandinavian markets and then approached the more psychically and physically distanced 
markets Great Brittan and Germany. Mr. Brolin also explains that Company X withdrew from 
Spain and Belgium and reduced its commitments in France due to cultural differences. This is in 
line with the importance of psychic distance suggested in the early version of the Uppsala Model 
and the firm’s ability to manage risk by changing their commitment in markets pointed out in the 
latest version of the Uppsala Model. In these two examples Company X had misjudged the 
cultural barriers and therefore decided to reduce the level of commitment to a risk level the 
company was willing to bare. This meant a full withdrawal out of Belgium as well as Spain and a 
stepwise retreatment of commitments in France. When entering the French market the company 
decided do deviate from its former internationalization strategy possibly because of its former 
success in Germany and England, thereby underestimating the importance of market specific 
knowledge and overestimating its experiential knowledge. When sales figures did not rise in 
accordance with expectations due to cultural differences, the company saw no other possibility 
than to reduce its commitment and assets at risk. Mr. Brolin and Mr. Dahlin see special 
challenges for northern European firms in terms of cultural differences and language in France 
and Belgium. Mr. Brolin believes that the French and Belgian more than other nationalities prefer 
to purchase products or services from local companies. He therefore suggests the use of a 
domestic name, the establishment of a legal entity and hiring local employees to overcome these 
obstacles. 
Company Z also began its internationalization process with markets close to Germany such as 
Austria and Switzerland. The managements’ choice to enter the Swedish market was based on the 
fact that the management team has strong knowledge about the country. Their knowledge of the 
Swedish culture and language decreased psychic distance. So far the interviewees seem to agree 
on the fact that cultural barriers play an important role when picking out markets to enter and 
which mode to choose. However, our case studies also show some deviations from the predicted 
importance of psychic and physical distance in the internationalization process. E.g. the psychic 
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distance between Denmark and Sweden is generally considered to be short. However the demand 
for Company X’s products in Denmark was much lower than in other Scandinavian markets or 
even Germany and England. After trying to enter the market for a while through exporting, the 
company relinquished to enter the market since the market attractiveness was too low. Mr. 
Ravelli leads the low attractiveness of the Danish market back to cultural differences between 
Denmark and most other European countries. The Uppsala Model neglects to point out that only 
small cultural differences between two countries can make a market unattractive even though the 
overall psychic distance is low. 
Furthermore, Company Z’s choice to enter the Spanish market was primarily based on its 
positive rating of the market, by classifying it as a very attractive market and the owner’s 
network. Patrik and Daniel Andersson point out the importance of trust to the person in charge 
and the network of a firm. In the case of Company Z the psychic distance is reduced through its 
network and language skills of the management. 
The markets Company Y chose to enter are not the closest to its domicile when it comes to 
cultural and geographical distance. This is in dispute with older version of the Uppsala Model. 
Mr. Dahlin explains that the choice of markets is based solely on the network of the firm. This is 
in consistent with Patrik and Daniel Andersson’s view and backs up the latest version of the 
Uppsala Model and the implementation of the network view. We conclude that psychic distance 
is less important than the management team’s network for an internationalizing firm and support 
the implementation of the network view into the Uppsala Model postulated by many authors 
before the implementation. Further it seems that the combination of market knowledge within the 
organization’s network and the expected demand for the company’s product or service in this 
market is primarily influencing the market choice decision. 
The interviewees in our case studies do not consider physical distance to be of great significance. 
According to Company X, the importance of physical distance has decreased during the last 
decades due to the effects of globalization and technical developments. Company X’s experience 
show that free trade embargos and the creation and strengthening of the EU have made it less 
inconvenient for firms to enter markets further away from their domestic market. Company Y 
does not see any significant obstacles when expanding to markets far away from its domicile. 
They have already been in contact with potential partners in India and on the North American 
61 
 
west coast. Even though our interviewees consider the impact of physical distance on the firm’s 
internationalization process to be limited, all three companies acknowledge traveling long 
distances to be time consuming. Moreover they classify engaging in a market located on another 
continent as a large commitment. Mr. Dahlin Executive Chairman of Company Y informed us 
that avoiding travelling time was one of the reasons why the company decided to go with 
licensing as their choice of entry mode. This entry mode requires less presence of the domestic 
management team then many others. The fact that Company X and Company Z, two companies 
with an exclusively European sales structure manufacture their products in Asia, is strengthening 
the argument of low importance of physical distance in the today’s world. This is also interesting 
from a psychic distance point of view, since the commitment associated with setting up a joint 
manufacturing facility or finding contractual manufacturers is considered as high by the Uppsala 
Model. To sum up it seems that physical distance and psychical distance can be overcome by the 
choice of entry mode, through technological developments and the network of a firm. 
Research question 2: How does top management’s background and network affect the choice of 
internationalization strategies and markets? 
As already scratched on in the discussion of the previous research question our empirical findings 
confirm the decision of Johanson and Vahlne to implement the network perspective in the 
updated version of the Uppsala Model. In our interviews we found out that networks but also the 
backgrounds of managers play an important role in the internationalization process of firms. 
Especially in the cases of company Y and Z the firms’ networks substantially influence the 
choice of foreign markets. Company Y would not have entered foreign markets at all if it would 
not have been for its network. Mr. Dahlin explains that the management team of Company Y has 
very limited knowledge about the foreign markets. Instead they rely on the knowledge of the 
licensees. Company Z’s international expansion is also heavily influenced by its network. 
Without the owners’ family friend Company Z would probably only be operating in one other 
country than Germany today. The background of the management team, their international 
experience and language skills were critical in their choice of markets. This can be illustrated by 
the company’s choice to enter the Swedish market. Patrik and Daniel Andersson admit that the 
market is less attractive than others, from a market size and market growth perspective but the 
low cultural barriers and the high market knowledge decreased uncertainty of the Swedish 
market, which made it more attractive than others. The interviews with Company X also 
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strengthen the proposed importance of management’s background. The cultural barriers between 
Great Brittan, Germany and Sweden were lower for Company X than for other Swedish firms 
due to the fact that there were many employees within the company who spoke English and 
German. These findings clearly show how the concept of uncertainty is related to the knowledge 
that exists within the organization and how this affects the choice of foreign market. 
Trust in the updated version of the Uppsala Model is considered to be the key to build strong 
relationships. This is supported by the findings from our interviews, as all the interviewees 
emphasize the importance of identifying trustworthy partners. Mr. Brolin partly blames the 
withdrawal from the Belgian and Spanish markets on the fact that they trusted the wrong people. 
Trust is has also been an issue for Company X when entering the Norwegian market. The 
company’s first agent was a previous customer, and the managers of the sales entity established 
later on were previous employees of the former agent. According to the Uppsala Model every 
step of increased commitment leads to an increase in trust between network’s partners and 
therefore to stronger but also new relationships. The Norwegian example also shows that the 
relationship between increased commitment and trust is complex. Increasing commitment can 
also result in a worse relationship with less trust than before or even a break up. However as the 
Norwegian example implies the firm’s network increases and new possibilities can appear. 
Patrik and Daniel Andersson mentioned that they positioned their company in a niche market 
with an environmentally friendly target group. Therefore gaining a position inside a “green-
thinking” network was crucial for Company Z. Being an “insider” of a strong environmentally 
friendly network allows the company to improve its products and attract further customers 
through spillover effects. 
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Research question 3: How do commitment and, uncertainty influence the choice of entry mode of 
SMEs? 
According to our interviewees, the intended degree of commitment and the uncertainty 
concerning the market influence the choice of entry mode in internationalizing firms. Mr. Ravelli 
and Mr. Brolin point out that a good research of potential markets is critical before entering a 
new market. This is in perfect accordance with the Uppsala Model since it states that firms try to 
decrease uncertainty to be able to commit to a market without taking on too much risk. Further, 
interviewees from all three companies agree on the usefulness of agents or licensing agreements 
when entering a new market. Thereby taping important information from the market and thus 
decreasing uncertainty. However the knowledge a company can gain through these modes is 
limited according to Mr. Ravelli. 
Company Y uses licensing as their entry mode so far, since this mode requires low investments 
and is easy to reverse. The choice between agents or license agreements might also be correlated 
with the type of product or service of a company. Both producing companies in our sample are 
mainly using agents abroad the service company uses exclusively licensing as its entry mode. 
These findings are perfectly in line with the Uppsala Model, entering foreign markets with low 
commitment when facing high uncertainty. The accuracy of the Uppsala Model’s statement 
becomes even more obvious when looking at a quote of Mr. Ravelli: “The higher your 
uncertainty about a market is, the lower your investments in this market should be.” The 
interviews with Company X and Company Z back up the statement of the Uppsala Model that 
commitment will lead to more knowledge and a stronger network of relationships, followed by 
lower uncertainty. This will in turn make further commitments possible. Company X follows this 
pattern both when entering Germany and Great Brittan. Even though Company Z has not yet 
increased its commitment in foreign countries, the company experiences that the company’s 
knowledge of the foreign markets increase due to its presence within the market. However Mr. 
Ravelli also mentions the draw backs of using agents, pointing out that those agents need to be 
bought out when establishing an own sales force. This could have been one main reason why 
Company X decided to enter the French market with a higher commitment in the form of a sales 
subsidiary and a warehouse, instead of implementing an agent first. This decision was made 
straight after the company successfully entered the German and English market. We therefore 
believe that the recent success at this time period led the company to overestimate the 
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applicability of its experiential knowledge gained in other countries and neglected the importance 
of market specific knowledge. The difficulty in choosing the right entry mode and degree of 
commitment lies within defining the degree of uncertainty correctly. This example shows the 
significance of distinguishing between actual and perceived risk. 
Research question 4: What steps do SMEs take in the internationalization process and is there a 
difference of start-ups and established companies? 
In our case studies, it appears that established companies have more resources, which gives them 
a greater freedom when choosing which entry mode they will use. Even if Company Y and 
Company Z state that they believe it is suitable to use entry modes that require low commitment 
when first entering a market, they also state that they are left with little choice due to their scarce 
amount of resources. This implies that it is not only uncertainty and knowledge about a market 
along with a firm’s network that determines the choice of entry mode, but also the available 
resources.. The Uppsala Model with its general approach misses this aspect. 
In the case of Company X commitments in relationship within several countries seem to follow 
the Internationalization Process Model (Figure 3). Entering Great Brittan, Germany and Norway, 
they began with low commitment through agents and then proceeded by establishing sales 
subsidiaries. Using the reasoning in the Internationalization Process Model, the companies first 
recognized opportunities within their existing network position and decided to increase the 
commitment by entering the market using agents. The decision to increase the commitment then 
resulted in a new network positions and from this position they recognized new opportunities and 
increased their commitments by setting up sales entities. 
Our case studies also describe a more complex reality. For example, in Norway Company X’s 
choice to end the contract with the agent and instead establish a sales entity was not merely based 
on a decreased level of uncertainty. Company X was dissatisfied with the agent and therefore 
decided to end the relationship. They then chose to start a sales entity, which is considered to be 
an even larger commitment. However this was due to the fact that Norway is not a member of the 
EU, which led to complications with the customs. Company X had difficulties after they entered 
the French, Belgian and Spanish markets. The difficulties led to a desired decrease in 
commitments on these markets. At present time they therefore rely on an agent in France and 
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have no representation in Belgium and Spain any more. The example of Company X shows that 
the firms’ commitment may sometimes decrease due to unforeseen complications like cultural 
differences or the overestimation of the company’s market specific knowledge in France due to 
high experiential and general knowledge gained in Germany and England. We come to the 
conclusion that this does not contradict with the Uppsala Model; on the opposite it rather 
confirms it, since the model acknowledges the possibility of firms to reduce their commitments in 
order to manage risk (R = U x C). The present network position will create opportunities and 
increase knowledge. However this will not necessarily lead to an increase in commitment; the 
Uppsala Model merely predicts that it might lead to a change in commitment. 
The fact that companies enter countries in order to reduce production cost has not been taken into 
account by the Uppsala Model neither in the first nor in the latest version of the model. Instead 
establishing production facilities in a foreign country is considered a late step in the 
internationalization process of a firm. 
Our empirical findings, especially from Company X and Z, show that companies started to shift 
their production to countries of lower production costs already in the late 1970’s, due to an 
increase of production costs in Western European countries. During that time Company X 
established production facilities or closed contractual production agreements in Poland Hungary 
and later on in China. After producing in Poland and Hungary for a while they started also selling 
their products in these countries. In Hungary sales was totally autonomous of the production 
facilities. In Poland however a sales subsidiary was established. However after about ten years all 
legal entities were closed and their engagement in Poland buried. Since then products are 
exported to some new and remaining clients from Germany. In the case of Poland Company X 
took the exact opposite way of the Uppsala Model and started with high commitment and then 
slowly decreased its commitment over time. Company X did initially not intend to sell its 
products in these markets (Poland and Hungary). For more than 20 years products have been 
produced mainly in Asian factories, first in a joint production facility and later only through 
contractual agreements. The company however does not intend to distribute their products on the 
Asian market in the foreseeable future. The only motive of moving production was to reduce 
production cost. Company Z is following the exact same strategy. 
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Alserud & Tykesson,  2011 
This phenomenon of moving or outsourcing production to countries of lower production costs is 
not new but started to take off in the 1980’s. However it did not find any consideration of 
Johanson and Vahlne when they updated their model. The differences between our findings and 
the Uppsala Model lies with in the fact that today shifting the production to different countries is 
often not connected to the sales side of the value chain but instead to the cost side. We challenge 
the assumption of the Uppsala Model that firms steadily and incrementally increase their 
commitments while uncertainty decreases until companies establish production facilities in each 
foreign country of sales, since this stands in conflict with our empirical findings. 
Our hypothesis is that many manufacturing firms, especially SMEs, will not increase their 
commitment in a foreign market infinitely or up to a point at which they start producing in the 
same market just because uncertainty decreased. Instead they will stop increasing their 
commitment at an earlier stage, at a commitment level they feel comfortable with e.g. sales 
subsidiary or agent and use their resources to increase their commitments in other markets 
(Figure 10). 
We admit that companies can increase their 
commitment in a foreign market in other 
ways than changing the operating mode in a 
country. For example through hiring 
additional sales personnel or increasing the 
number of show-rooms. However based on 
our empirical findings, we believe that this is 
not an infinite process and that a company is 
not heading towards its maximum tolerable 
risk level in each foreign market on the long 
run. As mentioned earlier Company X has 
increased its commitments on some markets 
from agents to sales subsidiaries, but in most 
cases they kept using agents or sales offices 
associated with a lower degree of commitment. The interview with Mr. Dahlin at Company Y 
also leads us to believe that this process applies to service companies as well since they will 
probably keep using licensee agreements in the future as their foreign operating mode and not 
Figure 10 Limited commitment  
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increase their commitment even though uncertainty decreases. However we leave this question 
unanswered for further research. 
Research question 5: Does the internationalization process of a firm differ, depending on the 
product’s nature? 
The Uppsala Model does not take into account any differences in the nature of the products that 
are sold by firms. Even though the nature of the studied firms’ products and services differ, we 
have not found any evidence suggesting that service companies and manufacturing companies 
should be treated differently in their internationalization process. However, the choice of market 
does depend on the nature of the product. The most important aspect is the possibility and the 
severity of adopting the product to a foreign market. Company X exited the USA because of 
substantial technical differences between Europe and USA. On the other hand, Company Y is 
according to Mr. Dahlin not concerned about differences between countries, since the company’s 
service is applicable almost regardless of cultural differences. 
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6 Conclusion 
After extensively reviewing the Uppsala Model we realized some minor obscurities fogging the 
clarity of the model, which we described and ironed out in chapter 2.1.4 Risk Management. The 
main problem is that Johansson and Vahlne miss pointing out the time-lag in a more extensive 
way when presenting the risk equation (R = U x C) and the risk curve. Part of the contribution of 
this paper is visualizing and explaining the importance of time, when discussing the relation 
between a firm’s commitment, uncertainty and risk in its internationalizing process (Figure 5 and 
6). An increase in commitment will immediately lead to an increase in total risk; but uncertainty 
will decrease with a lower rate of speed. This is due to the fact that acquiring knowledge is a time 
consuming process for a firm. 
However the main purpose of this paper is to increase the understanding of the Uppsala Model 
through testing its applicability on European SMEs. In principal our empirical findings confirm 
the applicability of the Uppsala Model on SMEs. Due to these findings, we fully agree with the 
integration of the network perspective into the updated version of the Uppsala Model by 
Johanson and Vahlne. When investigating the case studies we consolidated with the importance 
of network effects. In a direct comparison it becomes clear that network effects play a more 
significant role then psychic distance. Nevertheless we continue to believe that psychic distance 
is still an important factor of uncertainty. However we argue that this obstacle can be overcome 
by being part of a strong network and trustworthy partners. The background of a firm’s 
management can also aid to shorten psychic distance and influences the choice of foreign 
markets. 
We are also in consent with the authors of the Uppsala Model regarding the trade-off between 
commitment and uncertainty. Firms tend to enter markets of high uncertainty using entry modes 
of low commitment such as agents and licensing. However this also depends on the available 
resources of firms. Moreover our empirical findings endorse with Johanson and Vahlne’s 
opinion, that companies can manage their risk level by actively modifying their commitment. 
Yet, we challenge the assumption that firms will steadily and incrementally increase their 
commitments because the uncertainty of a foreign market decreases. This results in our 
hypothesis, that many manufacturing firms, especially SMEs will not increase their commitment 
in a foreign market infinitely or up to a point at which they start producing in it. Instead they will 
stop increasing their commitment at an earlier stage, in which the firm feels more comfortable 
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with its level of commitment. Further the authors miss the fact that companies strive for low 
production costs and therefore do not aim to move their production to countries of sales (Figure 
10). In contrast those firms significantly increase their commitment in countries of low 
production costs without aiming to gain any revenue streams from these countries in the present 
or the future. 
To sum up, we believe the Uppsala Model to be very general. This is the reason why it fails to 
explain some complexities in the real world. Simultaneously the model’s general approach is also 
its biggest strength. Since it focuses on explaining the fundamental elements of internationalizing 
firms it is possible to apply the model to a wide range of situations. Nevertheless in order to 
increase its understanding we would appreciate to see a stronger integration of entry modes in 
further developments of the model. Most importantly we want to encourage other researchers to 
test our hypothesis on a greater sample. 
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Appendix 1: Internationalisation Process Models 
 
Appendix 2: Definition of SMEs 
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Appendix 3: Interview Guide 
1) What markets is your company operating in? 
 
2) What drives SMEs to enter foreign markets and what steps do they take? 
 
3) When you entered market a, b, c what were your entry modes?  
 
4) Do you think an incremental order is advisable when going abroad? Starting with low 
commitment and then steadily increasing commitment as uncertainty decreases? (e.g. No 
export, Export, Agent, Sales subsidiary, Production) 
 
5) How has experiential knowledge and objective knowledge influenced your 
internationalization decisions? Are they equally important? 
 
6) Did your company change the location of production? 
 
7) How did you approach the new markets? 
 
8) How do you think does the internet influence the choice of entry modes today?  
 
9) Do you think that technological developments such as the Internet, videoconferences 
transportation has made it easier for start-ups to go abroad, compared to 20 years ago?  
 
10) What were your main driving forces/goals/ strategy when entering market a, b, c? And 
what aspects influenced the choice of markets?  
 
11) What do you think is critical when going abroad? 
 
12) How, do you think that the background of top management influences the choice of 
country? 
 
C 
 
13) Did you during your time working at company X, Y, Z see any changes in the importance 
of physical distance between the domestic and new foreign market, when choosing new 
markets to enter? If Yes, how? 
 
14) Did you during your time working at company X see any changes in the importance of 
physical distance between the domestic and new foreign market, when choosing new 
markets to enter? If Yes, how? 
 
15) Would you agree with the statement, that market knowledge decreases uncertainty and 
therefore allows an increase in commitment? 
 
16) What influence did the network of your firm have on the market choice? 
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Appendix 4a: Interview I with Mr. Brolin Company X 7th of May 
 
Historical Review of Company X’s Production: 
1942-1970’s   Sweden (domestic, fully owned)  
1980-1989   DDR (external, 15-20% of production) 
1980-1999   Poland (fully owned) 
1987-   Hungary (fully owned)   5% of Sales today 
Production in China 
1987-   Contractual production agreements Today 95% of production 
1991-2004  JV (50% ownership)   Personal issues lead to break up 
The Reasons behind Production Shifts: 
 Reducing production cost 
 Selling products with not too complicated technology allows having production externally 
and far away from the domestic market. 
 It is not always useful for SMEs to have a production plant in every country of sales 
especially today, with less trade barriers and different labor costs in different countries. 
 
Historical Review of Countries of Sales: 
 Scandinavia (Denmark, Finland, and Norway): Started early with export  and switched 
then too agents in the late 1970’s early 1980’s. When the partnership with the Norwegian 
agency ended in 2000, due to missing satisfaction on both sides, a legal sales entity was 
created in Norway. This was done mainly due to customs issues which appeared since 
Norway is not part of the EU. Two former employees of the sales agency were hired and 
put in charge of the sales subsidiary. In Finland we tried out different sales agents until 
we established an own sales force in the form of a sales office in 2000.
5
 We were never 
present on the Danish market in the form of sales offices or sales subsidiaries. 
                                                          
5
 The difference between a sales office and a sales subsidiary is that a sales office is not a legal entity. The 
personally is paid by the parent company and the business premises are either rent or owned by the parent 
company. 
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 Germany: 1980- 1983 the company was working with Sales agents, no warehousing 
(Revenue 1 mil SEK GER, total sales 25 mil SEK). We wanted to keep our commitment 
low and carefully test the market especially since an external advisor made a market 
analysis which resulted in a discouraging advice, not too enter the German market. The 
German chamber of commerce saw only a little probability for Company X to be 
successful in Germany. The In 1983 a sales subsidiary (GmbH) with warehousing was 
opened, to day the company has a world wide sales of around 50 million EUR. “You 
could say that the German Chamber of Commerce was wrong.” 
 
 England: In the early 1980’s  Company X was working together with an agent, who in 
1985 became the CEO of the new sales subsidiary (Ltd), with warehousing. 
 
 France: In 1995 a sales subsidiary (SARL) with warehousing was opened. In 2002 the 
SARL was closed and replaced by an agent instead. After another one to two years the 
business relation was broken down. Afterwards, a sales office was established and a 
former employee of the SARL was hired. Since goals still were not met until 2006 the 
sales personnel is now operating from Germany. 
 
 Poland: Between 1982- 2005 a sales subsidiary and warehouse existed in Poland. 
 
 The Netherlands: In the Netherlands Company X worked together with an agent from 
1985 to 1988. After that a sales office with show-room was established in 1988. 
 
Today’s Sales Offices6 
 The Netherlands 
 France 
 Finland (1995-) 
 
Today’s Export: 
 Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Poland, Hungary, Denmark 
                                                          
6
 Not a legal entity, but own sales personnel and offices.  
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 Austrian agents help dealing with the eastern European countries. 
Agents 
 Italy (2007-) 
 Norway (1980’s-2000) 
 Austria (1998-) 
 Switzerland (1990-2009) changed agent two times, since 2009 operating  over Germany 
 
Countries of Withdrawal: 
 Belgium (1996-1999) cultural differences reasons for failure 
 Spain (2003-2006) 
 USA, Canada (1996-1999) market was too big and there is a strong need for product 
adjustments due to technological differences. There was a need for higher commitment in 
terms of money and time; the CPY was not willing to take this risk. The physical distance 
was also an obstacle. As a consequence we shifted our focus back on Europe: We want to 
get stronger in countries with lower sales (e.g. east Europe) before we enter new markets 
especially outside of Europe. Generally we prefer EU members to none EU-members; 
however this is not a knock-out criterion. 
 “You should always be strong in your domestic market before you go abroad. Only take 
close countries with you if a good opportunity arises. In the beginning it will always take 
more time to grow in sales in a foreign country than in your home country (Translation of 
and adjustments of documents and course of action (home page, pricing, price lists, legal 
issues, marketing campaigns etc.)” 
 
Biggest Challenges, which Lead to Withdrawal: 
 Different cultures and business cultures as well as trusting the wrong people were the 
most important reasons for failing goals in foreign markets. 
 Trade barriers in the 70’s and 80 have made it very difficult to sell products to clients in 
other countries within Europe, without establishing a legal entity. 
 Technological development helped (telephone telefax fax Internet) 
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Suggestions and Challenges for France and Belgium: 
 Domestic name, legal entity and employees 
 Communication problems 
 “French like to buy from French companies” 
 “In France I generally recommend acquisition instead of Greenfield investments.” 
 In the 90’s Company X was considering to by a French company in order to increase their 
commitment and overcome cultural barriers. 
 
Reasons behind the Choice of Markets: 
 German and English were spoken by most of the company’s top management and 
business owners. 
 We firstly tried to enter close markets, in terms of distance and culture. Starting out with 
Scandinavian countries and in a next step aiming on Germany and England. 
 We were mostly interested in growth and therefore very interested in the size of the 
markets. It was no accident, that we first entered smaller and close markets and then 
attacked bigger and more distanced markets (physically and psychic). 
 Top management had international experience, which pushed them abroad. 
 
Further Quotes 
“We went from countries with low psychic and physical distance to countries with higher psychic 
and physical distance.”  
“Nordic countries have a free trade agreement since a long time.” 
“In some countries and under certain circumstances, it is better to keep working with an agent 
and not to built up an own sales subsidiary. It is not always the case, that you increase sales with 
an own subsidiary. If you end the association with an agent, you will always lose clients, 
depending on how strong the agent is. It is not always possible to make the agent head of a new 
sales subsidiary, since this depends on how successful he already is and if he prefers to stay 
independent. This is especially true, when he has a big product portfolio, revenue and many 
employees.” 
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Appendix 4b: Interview II with Mr. Brolin Company X and 8th of May 
 
1) What do you think is critical when going abroad? 
Answer: 
A good internal research of the market (Competitor-, product- and demand analysis, 
infrastructure and payment behavior) 
 
2) Do you think an incremental order, starting with low commitment and then steadily 
increasing commitment as uncertainty decreases is advisable (e.g. No export, Export, Agent, 
Sales subsidiary, Production)? Please justify your answer. 
Answer: 
Generally yes, but it is not necessary to go all the steps in each foreign country, sometimes it is 
better to stop at one step. 
 
3) What were your main driving forces/goals/ strategy when entering market a,b,c and what 
aspects influenced your choice of markets? 
Answer: Growth in sales 
 
4) How has experiential knowledge and objective knowledge influenced your 
internationalization decisions? Are they equally important? 
Answer: 
Experiential knowledge is more important than objective knowledge. However external 
research can be helpful as well. 
 
5) How did you approach the new market in terms of making contact, legal advice, location 
etc.? 
Answer: 
 First we made an internal market analysis sometimes even an external (e.g. Germany) 
 Secondly we entered the market with an Agent 
 Thirdly(could already be done in step 2) we looked for the right person (speaking 
Swedish and knowing the foreign country’s market and culture) 
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 Not always but often implemented a sales subsidiary 
 Germany was after Scandinavia the first choice due to its market size cultural closeness 
and central location in Europe(Switzerland, Austria, Italy, France). Within Germany a 
central position was also important to us. 
 
6) What factors did influence your choice of commitment to new markets and the changes of 
commitment to those markets as time passed. 
Answer: 
The financial position of the parent company is of course important. As the knowledge of the 
market decreases the willingness to increase commitment rises. This is the drawback working 
with agents; your market knowledge growth is limited. 
 
7) In which way did you acquire/gain new knowledge about the new markets?  
Answer: 
Internal and external market analysis was used in order to gain further knowledge. Today 
faster, less costly and a little more acquired then before the Internet existed.  
 
8) What influence did the network of your firm have on the market choice? 
 
Answer: 
The biggest influence had international clients, who made us sell to their network in countries 
we did not have any revenue before. 
 
9) What influence did the environment (public pressure, trends, competitors, etc.) of your firm 
have on the market choice? 
Answer: The expansion and the strengthening of the EU had an influence 
 
10) In which way did the background of top management influence the choice of country?  
Answer: It had influence when it comes to language and acquaintances 
 
11) How do you think does the Internet influence the choice of entry mode today? 
Answer: It makes the internal research quicker and more accrued. 
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12) What differences in communication have you noticed due to technological developments such 
as the Internet (e-mail, video conferences, etc) and transportation (low cost airlines), 
compared to 20 years ago?  
Answer: 
The world has grown closer and communication has become easier. 
 
13) How did the strengthening and expansion of the EU affect internationalization for the 
Company you worked for? 
Answer: 
It facilitated sales, logistic and infrastructure. 
 
14) Did you during your time working at Company X see any changes in the importance of 
physical distance between the domestic and new foreign market, when entering new markets? 
Please justify your answer. 
Answer: 
Became less of an obstacle but needs still to be considered. Infrastructure improved and 
Internet is a good substitute to telephone and fax messaging. However long distance flights 
remain long distance flights. 
 
15) Did you during your time working at Company X see any changes in the importance of 
psychic distance between the domestic and new foreign market, when choosing new markets 
to enter? Please justify your answer. 
Answer: 
There is a higher understanding of different cultures today. Europe is more open to foreign 
companies than before. 
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Appendix 5: E-mail Interview with Mr. Ravelli Company X 12th, 14th 16th of May 
 
1) When you entered the other Scandinavian markets what were your entry modes and why was 
this specific entry mode chosen? Did you change the mode during your operations in the 
different countries? 
a. Indirect exporting (distributors or importers) 
b. Direct exporting (Agents) 
c. Direct sales (Own sales force) 
d. Licensing 
e. Franchising 
f. Strategic international alliance 
g. International Joint Venture 
h. Consortia 
i. Foreign Direct Investments in a production facility(FDI) 
i. Greenfield 
ii. Acquisition 
Answer: 
When entering the Scandinavian market there were different factors affecting the decision? 
How we entered different markets: 
 
The first market to enter was Norway. In this case the choice was to appoint an Agent being 
responsible for the whole country. The appointed Agent had along with some other customers 
purchased our products for some years, over Sweden. Appointing an Agent is a relatively cheap 
and good way when starting exporting. If they sell badly, you have not wasted a lot of recourses, 
e.g. personnel and marketing expenditures etc..The big disadvantage is of course that you have no 
control over the market and not the same access to market specific information compared to self 
entering the market. You rely deeply on the information you get from your agent. 
 
The situation in Denmark was a bit different. Traditionally Danish people are a trading society 
who gained great experiences in trading over the history. Many potential clients were already 
importing their products directly from Asian producers to prices we could not compare with. 
During my time we exported our products from Sweden to Denmark but the sales generated was 
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very low. Denmark has always been a tough market for Company X due to the reasons 
mentioned earlier. Therefore we never considered entering the Danish market by establishing an 
own sales subsidiary. 
 
In Finland, we started just as in Norway, with an agent. However the results did not fulfill our 
expectations, to be honest the results were quit badly. After we changed the agent we still could 
not improve our results. Therefore the decision was made to form a sales office with own sells 
personnel. 
 
2) What do you think is critical when going abroad? 
Answer:  
Investigating carefully into the market with respect to: 
 size 
 competition 
 price-level 
 special traditions 
 market structure (wholesalers, warehouses and chains etc.) 
 
3) Do you think an incremental order, starting with low commitment and then steadily increasing 
commitment as uncertainty decreases is advisable (e.g. no export, export, agent, sales subsidiary, 
production)? Please justify your answer. 
Answer: 
Without looking specifically at a certain market I believe that there are strong benefits coming 
with an own sales force. However, a company wanting to enter several markets in a short time, 
normally does not have the financial recourses to set up an own sales force on every market. 
You have to set priorities, when selecting the most promising markets and deciding on the entry 
mode. A trade-off exists between the number of countries to enter and the chosen entry mode. 
 
Where to start and how: 
Look at the size of the market and how quickly you can expect the “pay back” on your 
investments. You must keep in mind that introducing a new product into a foreign market takes 
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between three to five years, before you “break even”. The higher your uncertainty about a market 
is, the less your investments in this market should be. 
 
4) Do you think, that it is sometimes better to work with agents, or just export even though the 
uncertainty of a market decreases? In other words, market knowledge increases but commitment 
is fixed. 
Answer: This depends on the future prospects and size of the market.  
 
5) What were your main driving forces/goals/ strategies when entering different foreign markets 
and what aspects influenced your choice of markets? 
Answer:  
As mentioned in question number three, a company must prioritize some markets from others. 
In our case Germany was from all markets in Europe the most interesting market to us, right from 
the beginning, mainly due to the number of inhabitants and its geographical position. Therefore 
we founded a sales subsidiary in the middle of the 1980
th
 Germany became quickly, just as hoped 
a base for sales into adjoining countries, such as Holland, Belgium and Austria. Later we created 
further sales subsidiaries in Great Britain, France and Poland. 
 
6) How has experiential knowledge and objective knowledge influenced your internationalization 
decisions? Are they equally important? 
Answer: 
My personal experience is that “experiential knowledge” is more costly to get, but also more 
accurate when establishing an own business in a foreign country? As a base “objective 
knowledge” can help you avoid buying more costly “experiential knowledge”. 
 
7) Did your company change the location of production? If yes, what were the reasons for that and 
did you chose to sell products in these markets too? 
Answer:  
Our location of production has been repositioned enormously during the last 25 years. Starting 
out with having production located in only Sweden, it was partly shifted to sub-contractors within 
the DDR and Poland. After the fall of the “iron curtain” we were increasing the output in Polish 
factories especially in our own production plant. Parallel, the purchase of goods from the Far East 
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increased and in the beginning of 2000 the production was moved fully to China. The main 
reason for moving the production was the increasing labor cost in West Europe between 1980 and 
2000. 
 
8) How did you approach new markets in terms of contacts, legal advice, location etc.? 
Answer:  
When using Agent, most of the contacts were made through the Agents themselves by using their 
network. When investing in a own sales force, the most important factor at the beginning was to 
find a reliable person to employ. The next step is to use his or her contact net. In some cases we 
used “Exportrådet” or foreign partner to Swedish lawyers to gain information about the foreign 
market. 
 
9) What factors did influence your choice of commitment to new markets and the changes of 
commitment to those markets as time passed. (Examples of aspects: financial situation, 
knowledge about new market, relations, contacts etc.)  
Answer:  
As mentioned earlier, no company has the resources to enter all interesting markets at the same 
time efficiently. You are forced to set priorities then. Start by identifying the most interesting 
market for your company, and put all your recourses there. In this situation it could be reasonable 
to use agents, which is a good way to start the penetration of a market, without heavy 
investments. It must be noticed, that this choice could cause higher costs in the future, when you 
decide to “buy out” the agent to create an own sales force, being able to further use the network 
and contacts created by the agent. 
 
10) In what way did you (or the organization) acquire/gain new knowledge about the new markets?  
Answer:  
We acquired knowledge through contacts with “Exportrådet”, travelling in the country, using 
information from customers or other contacts. 
 
11) What influence did the network (suppliers, customers, cooperating firms etc.) of your firm have 
on the market choice? 
Answer: See Q 10 above 
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12) What influence did the environment (public pressure, trends, competitors, etc) of your firm have 
on the market choice? 
Answer:  
You always watch what your competitors and try to figure out what it is they are doing this of 
course has then an influence on your decision. 
 
13) In which way did the background of top management influence the choice of country? 
(Languages, relatives, international education/ working experience) 
Answer:  
Answer: In our company it had a relatively high influence on the decisions, especially when 
considering moving production to other countries. Company X employed a former manager from 
IKEA, he had been working within the production division of a big Swedish furniture producer. 
He was very familiar with concept of producing in low cost countries, especially the DDR, 
Poland and the Far East. These countries were the exact same countries we located our 
production in later on. Concerning the sales side, the chief of our sales office in Germany had a 
huge impact on our decision to continue expanding in Germany by founding a sales and storage 
subsidiary. 
 
14) How do you think does the Internet influence the choice of entry mode today? Do you think that 
this depends on the type of product or service? 
Answer:  
As Internet gives so much easier access to information you can get so much more information, 
which helps you to make the right decision. 
 
15) What differences in communication have you noticed due to technological developments such as 
the Internet (e-mail, video conferences, etc) and transportation (low cost airlines and fast trains), 
compared to 20 years ago? How does that affect the internationalization process of a firm? 
Answer: 
Due to the increased communications such as Internet, many more companies use this media to 
buy and sell all over the world, this sharpens competition. 
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16) How did the strengthening and expansion of the EU affect internationalization for the Company 
you worked for? 
Answer: 
It makes it easier to move goods, capital and people within the union. This allows a company to 
store goods in fewer countries and decreases the need for setting up companies in every country 
of sales. However you need to keep in mind that the tax authorities are still located locally, this 
can cause issues.  
 
17) Did you during your time working at Company X see any changes in the importance of physical 
distance between the domestic and new foreign market, when entering new markets? Please 
justify your answer. 
Answer:  
Yes, e.g. in terms of transportation. Nowadays you can use the same transport company all over 
Europe. The biggest change has happened in counties located in the eastern part of- Europe, such 
as Poland and the Baltic countries. 
 
18) Did you during your time working at Company X see any changes in the importance of psychic 
distance between the domestic and new foreign market, when choosing new markets to enter? 
Please justify your answer.  
Answer:  
I do not believe that the strengthening of the EU had an impact on how business is done between 
countries. “All business is local. In order to be successful, you need to know your markets and adapt to 
their specific rules.” 
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Appendix 6: Interview with Mr. Dahlin Company Y 12th  and 15th of May 2011 
 
1) In which markets are Company Y present? 
Answer: 
 France (also responsible for the Belgian and German market). The licensee in 
France has priority if entering Austria and Switzerland 
 Norway (Can also sell to customers on the boarder between Norway and Sweden 
and follow customers into Sweden) 
 They have been in contact with actors from India, Congo and Togo and USA. In 
the USA every state is considered as a independent market.  
 
2) Why France? 
Answer: 
 The person responsible of France knew one of the founders from before and likes 
the programs.  
 The responsible person in France knows the person responsible for the German 
market. He is a professor in philosophy.  
 Norway also contacted them because they had previous experience of the 
programs.  
 
3) When you entered market a, b, c what were your entry modes and why was this specific 
entry mode chosen? 
Answer: 
 They have chosen licensing.  
 They take no risks  
o Does not invest or lock any resources on the foreign market and no legal 
connections. The French system is difficult.  
o They want to be able to focus on the Swedish market. 
o They do not have resources to enter markets in any other way 
o The licensee is responsible for everything concerning their market. 
Responsible for translation, marketing etc. The licensees adopts the 
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programs to fit the cultural surroundings. Company Y then gets a 
predetermined amount of money for every program sold.  
 
4) What do you think is critical when going abroad? 
Answer: 
 They do not have any real knowledge about the foreign markets that they have 
entered and they do not need to. Instead it is crucial that the licensee has extensive 
knowledge and understanding of the market.  
o Company X has 0 percent knowledge 
o Licensee has 100 percent (is the one who is taking all the risk) 
 
5) What were your main driving forces/goals/ strategy when entering market a, b, c and 
what aspects influenced your choice of markets?  
Answer: 
 Enter markets because experienced actors interested in selling the programs in 
their domestic market have contacted them. If they had not been contacted they 
would not have entered foreign markets at this time. "The reason we do this now is 
because it is a cheap and almost risk-free source of revenue." 
 
6) What about the future then, would you consider alternatives to licensing?  
Answer: 
 Regardless if the Swedish organization grows in number and resources, there are 
no plans changing the strategy of entering new markets through licensing. They 
feel confident this being a good strategy since they take no risk and it require 
minimal effort from their side.  
 They might buy into the companies that have the license. They will then get the 
advantage of the established networks. It is possible that this turns out to be too 
expensive even if they will then take part of the network and customers. 
 The industry is tricky when it comes to buying companies since the crucial value 
is the relationships and network of key figures in the companies. The buy-in or 
take-over has to be friendly. Otherwise the key figures might leave and then the 
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network of customers will follow. This makes it hard to push into a market; it is 
better to be pulled.  
 To stay on friendly terms with the licensee important to avoid future issues related 
to hostile takeover.  
 
7) How important is psychic and physical distance in your process of entering new markets? 
Answer: 
 Cultural and physical distance is not interesting.  
 The programs are unique in the way that they are independent of cultural 
surrounding. It does not matter if companies are Russian, German or Spanish; the 
only adjustments needed are translation and the writing of new similes. E.g. 
changing from an ice-hockey example to a football example when adjusting them 
from Swedish to Spanish.  
 If they instead had chosen to enter markets by starting a sales subsidiary there 
would have been obstacles connected to both psychic and physical distance. The 
obstacles are basically costs in terms of money and the need of time they would 
have to invest. It is costly to travel between countries and it is time consuming. 
Also there is more bureaucracy due to legal and accountancy matters, associated 
with starting a subsidiary.  
 Licensing makes issues due to cultural differences and distance almost obsolete 
since they only have to meet very seldom. There is also very little paper work 
compared to starting a subsidiary. Since it is possible to e-mail drafts of contracts 
etc., the process is both fast and convenient. 
 
8) How has experiential knowledge and objective knowledge influenced your 
internationalization decisions? Are they equally important? 
Answer: 
 Since they use licensing they are not particularly concerned with any aspects of 
knowledge; what is important is that the licensees are driven and suited to sell the 
programs.  
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 The executive chairman has experience from board work of European 
organizations since 1994. He feels that the largest differences between countries 
are between the south and north of Europe. The northern countries are more 
oriented towards results while the southern countries can discuss issues for hours 
without really discussing anything. India seems to be more like the northern 
European countries. 
 If they were to actively seek new markets, it is more important for them to do an 
extensive market analysis than to have experience of new markets. When an 
interesting market then is identified, it is important to find a suitable partner who 
possesses more experience-oriented knowledge. Most likely to begin with markets 
close to the domestic market.  
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Appendix 7: Interview P. Andersson and D. Andersson Company Z May 10th 
2011 
 
1) When you entered markets A, B, C what were your entry modes and why was this specific 
entry mode chosen? Did you change the mode during your operations in the different 
countries? 
Answer: 
Since Company Y is a start-up company all our internationalization efforts are fairly new and 
there has been no change in entry modes so far. 
 Sweden: Agent  
 Austria: Agent 
 Switzerland: Agent 
 Spain: Licensing agreement 
 
 The choice was fairly easy, since we are a start-up without unlimited funds. Those entry 
modes allow us to test foreign markets and still keep commitment in form of investments 
and resources low. By choosing this strategy we gain more information about the market 
compared to just using importers and distributors located in Germany and the commitment 
is not much higher. 
 There were several reason why we decided to go with a licensing agreement in Spain, first 
of all we found a qualified person speaking both German and Spanish. Furthermore he has 
lived in both countries and knows both cultures. Secondly the Spanish market is very 
interesting for us, since the market is bigger and our seasonal product can be sold for a 
longer time period. We had already analyzed the Spanish market and identified it as a 
future market to enter, even before we met our contact. Moreover we are aiming for a long-
term commitment in this market. 
 
2) What do you think is critical when going abroad? 
Answer: 
 The most important thing is trust; you need to trust the people you work with and the other 
way around, no matter if it is an agent or an employee we are talking about. This is the only 
way to have a long and successful business relationship. 
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 Start with markets close to your home market in terms of their location, their culture and 
their language. Or make sure that you have the knowledge about these markets in your 
firm. 
 
3) Do you think an incremental order, starting with low commitment and then steadily increasing 
commitment as uncertainty decreases is advisable (e.g. No export, Export, Agent, Sales 
subsidiary, Production)? Please justify your answer. 
Answer: 
 I would generally agree with this statement. However I doubt that it is always beneficiary 
to steadily increase your commitment in a market. E.g. we located our production in Asia to 
due to production cost and the technological head start Asia has in our industry. Therefore 
it will be very unlikely that we will move production to our home market or other markets 
of sales. On the other hand we are not interested in selling in Asia. 
 
4) Do you think, that it is sometimes better to work with agents, or just export even though the 
uncertainty of a market decreases? In other words, market knowledge increases but commitment 
is fixed. 
Answer: 
 It is not necessarily the case, that if you increase your commitment, that you will increase 
revenues or profits at the same time. Often changes of foreign engagement are difficult and 
lead to a loss of clients. Especially in countries which high psychic and physical distance 
you should be cautious with Greenfield investments, if the company is lacking knowledge. 
 
5) What were your main driving forces/goals/ strategy when entering market a, b, c and what 
aspects influenced your choice of markets? 
Answer: 
 Growth 
 International education and working experiences 
 Family background 
 Trust worthy contacts 
 Language and cultural knowledge 
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6) How has experiential knowledge and objective knowledge influenced your internationalization 
decisions? Are they equally important? 
Answer: 
 Since we are a start-up company experiential knowledge is limited and can therefore only 
be acquired costly, therefore many early internationalization decisions were based on 
objective knowledge or knowledge of our personal network. With unlimited resources we 
would always prefer experiential knowledge over objective knowledge since it is more 
accrued. 
 
7) How did you approach new markets in terms of contacts, legal advice, location etc.? 
Answer: 
 We always try to locate our agents or leasing partners in central locations. We do that in 
order to reach a wide range of people with our products. In this content we also look at the 
population’s distribution and the closeness too major cities in and outside of the country. 
We also try to use our wide contact-network which we gained through our international 
education, working experience and our dual citizenship. 
 
8) What factors did influence your choice of commitment to new markets and the changes of 
commitment to those markets as time passed. (Examples of aspects: financial situation, 
knowledge about new market, relations, contacts etc. 
Answer: 
The three examples reflect our considerations in a good way. We would rank their importance in 
the following way.  
1. Contact person 
If you think that you have found the right person for the job, you are willing to put more 
effort into recruiting this person. If goals are not met, we first try to help out by increasing 
our involvement, if that does not help we reduce our time effort and watch out for further 
opportunities. 
  
X 
 
2. Knowledge about new markets 
You need enough knowledge to overcome your natural risk aversion; this is individual to 
every firm. How detailed your knowledge needs to be also depends a lot on how good your 
personal relation to the country is. 
3. Financial situation 
The balance sheet is a good indicator for, how many resources are available for the 
internationalization process. Since all resources, also time can be measured in money and 
costs money in the end. 
 
9) In what way did you (or the organization) acquire/gain new knowledge about the new 
markets? 
Answer: 
 Desk research, mainly over the Internet. 
 Visiting and investigating the market on site. 
 Contacting local friends as well as the Chambers of Commerce 
 
10) What influence did the network (suppliers, customers, cooperating firms etc.) of your firm have 
on the market choice? 
Answer: 
 Important to us was that our logistic partners are present in the country we expanded to. 
More over personal contacts in the market are always a good starting point for a first 
market analysis and they help you to overcome cultural barriers. Furthermore all the agents 
we are operating with in international markets were introduced to us by a dear friend and 
facilitated our internationalization process. Especially since you reach a deeper level of 
trust more quickly, compared to building up a business relationship with a total stranger. 
Our Leasing partner on the other hand approached us through a common friend and follow 
student. You can see that our personal network had a big influence on our choice of market.  
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11) What influence did the environment (public pressure, trends, competitors, etc) of your firm have 
on the market choice? 
Answer: 
 Due to big players in the market we decided to go into a niche market which we identified 
by analyzing recent trends. One of those trends we identified is being green and became 
very central to us. Therefore we also consider the ecological awareness of the population 
within a country. 
 
12) In which way did the background of top management influence the choice of country? 
(Languages, relatives, international education/ working experience) 
Answer: 
 The background of our top management had a huge impact on our internationalization 
strategies so far. We are not operating in any market where not at least one of us knows the 
domestic language of the market. Moreover we preferred to enter markets where we have 
closer ties to (friends, family, business contacts, vacation) even though they are less big. 
We do that mostly because we believe in understanding the culture of a country and 
speaking its language are major success factors when going abroad. “Do not try to concur a 
market being only motivated by sales.” 
 
13) How do you think does the Internet influence the choice of entry mode today? Do you think that 
this depends on the type of product or service? 
Answer: 
 In general I would say that the Internet has facilitated the internationalization process of 
firms in many ways. It is much easier to gain information about competitors and demand in 
foreign markets. Some products can also be sold over the Internet very easily. However 
other products of higher value are more difficult to be sold over the Internet and even more 
difficult over the Internet into foreign markets. Furthermore some business models are not 
intending to sell directly to the end consumer. For those companies the Internet is not a real 
distribution channel. 
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14) What differences in communication have you noticed due to technological developments such as 
the Internet (e-mail, video conferences, etc) and transportation (low cost airlines and fast trains), 
compared to 20 years ago? How does that affect the internationalization process of a firm? 
Answer: 
 It is much easier and cheaper to nurse business as well as private contacts, which allows us 
to keep and expand our network. This network often leads to unexpected business 
opportunities in different countries as well as in the home market. Furthermore it is easier, 
cheaper and quicker to follow one’s developments in foreign countries. 
 
15) How did the strengthening and expansion of the EU affect internationalization for the Company 
you worked for? 
Answer: 
 The power of the EU has not changed significantly since we founded our company 
therefore we have not been able to note any affects on our company. However we benefit a 
lot from the today’s situation and would have indubitable more trouble to go abroad 
without these trade facilitations. 
 
16) When entering new markets, has the importance of physical distance between the domestic and 
the new foreign market changed over time? Please justify your answer. 
Answer: 
 The world has become a smaller place. Therefore I believe that the physical distance is less 
of a problem, than a couple of decades ago. However long distance flights still take a long 
time and video conferences are not a full substitute to face to face meetings. It is important 
that the EU keeps the frontiers open for a free movement of members and goods. Countries 
which currently consider re-implementing board controls, risk losing attractiveness. 
Foreign firms will decrease their involvement in those firms, because of the inconvenience 
that is created artificially. 
 
17) When entering new markets, has the importance of psychic distance between the domestic and 
the new foreign market changed over time? Please justify your answer. 
I believe that the world has become a more intercultural place where different cultures more often 
consolidate with each other, especially in multi-cultural cities as New York or Paris. However there are 
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cities in Asia with a couple of million inhabitants, where white people are looked at as if they were aliens 
or superstars. I myself experienced that quiet often when travelling through Asia. The opposite seems also 
to be true in less urban regions in the US or Europe. What I’m trying to say is that I believe that cultures 
are more interlinked today but still far from being united to a single one. This is probably never going to 
happen. Many customs and habits from distanced cultures are still very odious to other cultures. Therefore 
top managers spend much time on learning about country specific habits and customs. 
